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ABSTRACT 
Inherited from economics, finance theories assume investors as rational 
economic agents, who automatically and instantaneously respond to information, and 
maximized their expected utility (EU) according to their time-persistent preferences. 
Unfortunately, overwhelming evidences show that such conceptualization depicts 
exceptional rather than normal human being, who are bounded by emotions and 
limited cognitive capacity. Behavioral finance paradigm thus calls for empirical study 
of investor behavior. 
Investment decision is an interaction between the task and the decision-maker. 
However, under the EU paradigm, most investment (risky choice) studies simplified 
unrealistically investment decision-making as gambles of a set of mathematical 
probabilities and payoff. Moreover, psychological studies focused primarily on 
cognitive errors in a particular decision process stage and decomposed decision tasks 
into several dimensions preferred by the researchers. Therefore, the majority of 
existing research suffered from low external validity due to three defects: a) 
unrealistic representation of real-world problem; b) negligence of the important 
interaction and coordination between different stages of the cognitive process; and c) 
negligence ofthe important role of emotions on the decision-making process. 
In response to the call for multidisciplinary, theory-driven research, this study 
integrated disconnected and even contradicting findings from psychology and 
experience of successful investors, to study the role of affect on decision-making in 
forex trading. Specifically, the influence of mood on information acquisition, 
evaluation and judgment, strategy formulation, judgment-strategy interaction, and 
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finally investment performance was examined. 
By an experimental simulation based on real news items and historical prices, 
this study found that trading performance was an interaction between judgment and 
investment strategy, in particular, investment size. Contrary to most literature 
suggested, positive affect caused insufficient information evaluation. The resulted 
poor judgments led to detrimental trading performance. Negative affect reinforced 
careful evaluation of particularly negative information and thus accurate judgment. 
However, their performance was impeded by sub-optimal strategies due to over-
cautiousness. Consistent with successful investors' experience, emotional neutrality 
promoted balanced information acquisition, and the use of non-compensatory 
strategies in information processing. The resulted accurate judgment and proper 
investment strategies led to stable and superior trading performance. 
The results supported the argument that investment decision is a conflict 
resolution process guided by the mood management principle. Mood influenced 
decision-making by affecting the psychic costs / benefits of a), engaging in the 
decision-making itself; and b). choosing a particular alternative. It thus suggested that 
investors digested information in a highly selective manner. Implications to both 












(cognitive error)而把決策課題解構成預設的幾個方面（dimensions) ° 因 
此，現有的大量硏究都有三個缺陷，導致較低的外部有效性（6\16 01&1 
validi ty) ： 1 )現實的決策課題沒有被真實地模擬；2 )情緒在決策過程 
中的重要作用沒有被顧及；3 )決策過程中的不同階段（stage)之間的協調 
和互動作用這一重要問題被忽略掉了。 
爲響應理論性跨科硏究（theory driven, and multi disciplinary 
approach)的方向’本文試圖結合心理學零散的研究成果和成功投資者的經 
驗，以研究外匯投資的決策過程。這過程包括：信息收集（1 n fo rma 11 on 
acquisition),衡量判斷(evaluation andjudgment)‘策略謀劃(strategy 









principle)指導下的衝突解決過程（conflict resolution process)。情緒 
通過影響對決策活動本身和決策方案的後果的心理成本/效用（psychic 
cos t/benefi t)從而影響決策過程。硏究結果對這一觀點帶來支持。此外， 
本文也討論了硏究結果對個人和機構投資者的啓示。 
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"...If he could insulate himself from the emotional whirlwinds ofthe 
stock market, he had the opportunity to exploit the irrational behavior 
of other investors, who purchased stocks based on emotion, not 
logic." 
-Warren Buffett, in (Hagstrom, 1994, p48) 
Overview: Neglected Role of Investors' Emotion 
The insight of Warren Buffett, a greatest investor, illustrates the relationship 
between emotions and market price, and the importance of emotional discipline to 
investment success. His insight is shared by many successful traders (Schwager, 1989， 
1992). On the contrary, finance theorists, inherited from economics, have assumed 
investors as rational economic agents, who had stable preference, reacted strictly to 
economic information, and maximize expected utility (Jegadeesh, 1995; Rabin, 1998). 
Emotions play no role in such conceptualization of investors. Instant adjustment to 
new information eliminates market abnormalities and results in market efficiency; and 
predicting price movement for abnormal retum is impossible (Fama, 1970). 
Such assumptions have aroused long lasting debate among academics and 
practitioners. Though there is various evidence supporting price efficiency, Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH) fails to explain well-aware market phenomena. For 
example, if market reflects all information, why market crashes from time to time? If 
achieving abnormal retum is impossible, why some investors like Warren Buffett and 
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George Soros are consistently profitable (see Schwager 1989, 1992; and Hagstrom, 
1994, for more evidence of investors achieving sustainable high retum)? 
Academic research also discloses ample evidence of market anomaly, such as 
January effect, over reaction, abnormal retum from small firms, losing firms, low PE 
firms (see Thaler, 1993 for more discussion on market inefficiencies). Existence of 
abnormalities suggests that not all information are reflected in prices. Empirical 
studies show that financial analysts' eaming forecast follows the psychological model 
of human judgment, instead of EU model (Hunter & Coggin, 1988). Stock prices in 
New York are even affected by weather, as investors are more bullish in sunny days 
than in cloudy days (Saunders, 1993). The weather effect also exists in Hong Kong 
market (Lam & Lam, 1998). Such evidence suggests that stock price is affected by 
investors' judgment process, and emotions in reacting to information. 
In fact, successful traders overwhelmingly emphasize the important role of 
emotions in investments or trading. For instance，Randy McKay, a successful trader 
interviewed by Schwager (1992，p.81) said, “I realized that prices moved based on the 
psychology of the people who were trading. I found it very interesting to follow the 
customers' moods and to see how these emotions translated into orders and ultimately 
into market price movements." In other words, as pure rational investor may not exist 
(Bensman, 1997)，market inefficiencies will persist. Those who have the emotional 
discipline then can identify and profit from such inefficiencies. 
Supporting successful investors' emotion perspective, psychological research 
registers evidence of violation against the premise o f " economic man." Specifically, a 
person's preferences are often influenced by changes in outcomes relative to his / her 
reference level, such as status quo, i.e., loss aversion (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 
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1979), pride and regret (Thaler, 1980), and framing of information (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981). Meanwhile, investors' preferences are time-variant, instead oftime-
consistent. People also depart from pure self-interest and utility maximization, to 
pursue other goals, such as faimess, reciprocal altruism, and revenge. Moreover, 
people deviate from normative Bayesian model in subjective probabilistic assessments 
due to systematic errors from use of heuristics, such as representativeness and 
anchoring, and fail to perceive correctly correlation. More compellingly, even experts 
are not immunized against those limitations. Therefore, traditional assumptions on 
investors may not hold (see, Rabin, 1998 for discussion). 
Inadequacies in Existing Theory and Research 
To account for the influence of emotional and cognitive factors on investments, 
the paradigm of behavioral finance has emerged. It admits that financial decisions of 
at least some economic agents are driven by biased expectations and non-economic 
decision criteria, and calls for empirical investigation of investor behaviors (Thaler, 
1993). By so doing, economic and finance theories can be reevaluated and 
reconstructed realistically. 
To deepening our understanding on investors, efforts have been made by 
economic and psychology researchers. Unfortunately, after Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) discovered cognitive errors in human decision-making in their Prospect Theory, 
not much progress has been made. And the role of emotion is unexplored (Elster, 
1998). A review by Bromiley & Curley (1992) concluded existing literature suffered 
from being "descriptive, sparse, and disconnected due to different disciplinary 
backgrounds-of researchers". Thus, there are strong needs for theory-driven and multi-
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disciplinary research. 
Moreover, major streams of decision research suffered from two defects. First, 
investment decision-making was equated unrealistically with choice behavior in 
games and gambles, in order to "discover" possible cognitive error or bias when 
comparing with the normative Expected Utility Model. Second, information was 
decomposed into several pre-defined dimensions in a hope to discover some basic 
decision rules in solving those simplified tasks. To differentiate speculation with 
gambling, Victor Sperandeo in New Market Wizard (Schwager, 1992, p. 255) said 
"Gambling involves taking a risk when the odds are against you...Successful 
speculation implies taking risks when the odds are in your favor. Just like in poker, 
where you have to know which hands to bet on, in trading you have to know when the 
odds are in your favor. ” To do that, the speculator need to select, interpret and weight 
information cues from various sources, to form judgment. Existing conceptualization 
and experiment representation of investment is unrealistic. 
Moreover, investment decision, as a risky choice, is an interaction between the 
decision task and the decision-maker. A full understanding of risky choice will require 
investigating both its cognitive and emotional determinants (Hogarth, 1987; Maule, 
1985). The two defects mentioned lead to negligence in both the complexities of the 
decision context and more important interactions and coordination between different 
information processing stages. As a result, many studies were criticized for low 
external validity (Ebbesen & Konecni, 1980; Keyes, 1985; Maule, 1985; Simon, 1979; 
Wagenaar, 1988). 
Moreover, over emphasis on the study of cognitive bias makes emotion, as an 
important factor in investment decision, neglected by psychologists, not to mention 
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about economists (Elster, 1998). Even though the issue of complex interplay between 
affect and cognition — how feelings shape thoughts and thought shapes feelings - has 
received major attention recently (Baron, 1993), literature on the relationship between 
emotion and risk taking is lacking and incomplete (Mann, 1992). 
Significance of Present Stu^y 
To connect the disconnected and even contrasting theories and findings from 
psychological study of cognition and affects, as well as successful investors' 
experience, this study employs a multi-disciplinary and theory-driven approach, to 
investigate how affect influences investment decision-making in foreign exchange 
trading. Specifically, how mood influences the decision-making process, from 
selection of information, judgment, to investment strategy formulation, and the final 
investment performance? 
By so doing, we can understand more about two questions: (a). “How do 
investors select, interpret, and respond to information?" and (b). “What is the role of 
mood in such judgment process?" Among various types of emotions, affect, defined 
as minor changes in people's mood states, is investigated in this study because we 
experience it everyday - understanding its effect on investment decision can help 
improving decision quality of both individual and institutional investors, and thus 




Existing literature on investor behavior is difficult to integrate since they vary 
considerably across situations and subject populations. There are two streams of 
studies on investors. The first approach is demographic study on investors. The 
second approach is psychology study on risky choice behavior, or risk-taking. 
Demographic Studies of Investors 
Demographic variables such as gender, age, occupation, and marital status, were 
used to differentiate investment style. According to a review by Bromiley and Curley 
(1992), findings in these studies included: investment professionals and individual 
investors used different evaluation criteria in a hypothetical investment setting; 
teachers and civil servants were inclined to avoid risky investments; unlike some 
studies in risk-taking, no gender or age effect were found. 
Studies on actual investors through mail survey showed that age, higher income, 
and being single were correlated to increased in risky assets. Though these studies 
showed the existence of individual differences in risk taking, Bromiley and Curley 
(1992) concluded: "these demographic variables explain little of the variance in these 
investment studies. The demographic variables' correlation with risk taking may be 
spurious or not useful." Moreover, they are difficult to differentiate effects of other 
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inter-related variables. 
In short, these descriptive studies did not address the important issue of 
investment decision. To enhance our understanding in the decision process, we can 
examine input from decision research. 
Decision Research on Choice Behavior 
The evolution of decision studies resulted in three paradigms. Personologism 
advocates that personality traits or cognitive styles are the main determinants of 
behavioral variation (e.g., Alker, 1971). Situationism stresses situational factors as the 
main sources of behavioral variation (e.g., Mischel, 1968). The third paradigm, which 
gains more supports from empirical evidences, is interactionism. It integrates the 
above two paradigms and emphasizes that the interaction between situation and 
decision-maker is the main reason for behavioral difference (e.g., Endler, 1975). 
Personality Trait / Cognitive Style Approach 
It assumes that risk-taking is generalizable across situations and that it varies 
with one or a very few individual characteristics, such as authoritarianism, tolerance 
of ambiguity, dogmatism, locus of control. 
Nonetheless, those studies could only explain a small proportion of decision 
variance (Taylor & Dunnette, 1974). Mischel (1968) concluded that only 5-10% of 
variance in behavior is attributable to individual differences. After a series of 
experimental lottery studies, Slovic (1972) found only modest correlation between 
prices of gambles and preference, and concludes that situational factors are more 
important. Case studies of risk takers also supported an individual-by-situation 
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analysis (Keyes, 1985). By studying the effect of decision style on information 
processing, McGhee, Shields, and Bimberg (1978) also concluded, “personality 
variables do not appear to be useful in describing, understanding or predicting human 
information processing." 
Moreover, the external validity of these representations had been questioned. As 
studies showed that degree of control influences behavior, gambling experiments 
using random devices may have extremely limited generality. And divergent results 
from naturalistic settings and laboratory settings (Wagenaar, 1988) suggested the need 
for a better situational analysis so that the interaction between task characteristics and 
the cognitive system of decision-maker could be better understood (see, Bromiley & 
Curley, 1992; Wright, 1985, for review). 
Nonetheless, though personality traits did not explain specific behavior, a study 
by Weigel and Newman (1976) found that attitudes correlated well (.62) with a 
measure based on overall behaviors. 
Overall, trait research suffered from the weakness of being descriptive, rather 
than explanatory. Also, findings general agreed that this approach could not control 
various intervening variables, therefore was not useful in explaining specific behavior. 
Therefore, it called for a situationist and interactionist approach. 
Situationist Approach 
It focuses on the contribution of task characteristics to decision variance. Most of 
cognitive researches on choice behavior fall in this category. I will first present an 
appraisal of the situational perspective, and then the major findings existed. 
Kahneman and Tversky's influential works are examples of situational study. 
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Their prospect theory stated that choice was affected by how the information was 
framed related to a reference point. In general, this type of research concluded that 
risky choice is affected by task complexity, the way information displayed, such as 
order, and framing, response mode, and the quality of the option set (Payne, 1985). 
Payne (1982, p.400) gave a summary in situation-oriented research. 
The present review strongly suggests the conclusion that decision making is a highly 
contingent form of information processing. The finding that decision behavior is 
sensitive to seemingly minor changes in task and context is one of the major results of 
years of decision research. It will be valuable for researchers to continue to identify task 
and context effects. Nevertheless, the primary focus of decision research should now be 
the search for some general principles from which contingent processing would follow. 
Interactionist Approach 
Since task characteristics can influence decision behavior, trait theorists have to 
examine the joint effects of situation and personality characteristics in determining 
behavior. The key is to identify cohesive sets of instances of situational categories and 
parsimonious set of individual characteristics (Bromiley & Curley, 1992). 
Unfortunately, existing knowledge provided little guideline to systematically classify 
situation psychologically. As Bromiley and Curley (1992) concluded: "The evidence 
strongly supports a conclusion that risk taking varies across populations and situations, 
but as yet does not give us strong guides as to how it varies." 
Wachtel (1973) explained this by saying that people selected, created, and 
constructed their own psychological environments. In Kahneman and Tversky's term, 
information was encoded to represent the decision problem, and served as the base to 
form judgment. In light of this perspective, we can infer that both contextual factors, 
such as framing of information, and human factors e.g., emotions, may affect the 
construction of the "psychological environment," and thus the judgment made. 
Therefore, to understand the judgment process, we need to study the interaction of 
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contextual and human factors. 
Summary 
In summary, reviews on the three paradigms in decision research suggest that the 
interactionist approach is a better approach of studying decision-making. The greatest 
challenge for a researcher is to realistically represent the decision task, and 
specifically investigate how individual factors (such as emotions) influencing the 
decision process. 
Findings in choice behavior res^earch 
Several major research streams had looked at choice behavior in experimental 
situations using games as tasks or lotteries as stimuli. Many researchers used lotteries 
as models of the decision situations under uncertainty. Similarly, games were used as 
metaphors of strategic decision-making (Bromiley & Cmiey, 1992). As discussed 
earlier, such task representation is over simplified. 
The reason is that traditional theories followed the works of Bernoulli (1738) on 
gambling, and used expected utility (EU) model as both normative and descriptive 
model of risky choice behavior. However, by reviewing inconsistencies in both 
experimental results (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky，1979) and real world data 
(Kunreuther, 1976), Schoemaker (1982) noted that at individual level, EU 
maximization was more the exception than the rule, as it failed to consider cognitive 
limitations of decision-makers. 
Notion of “Bounded Rationality" 
Simon (1955) explained that under the notion of "bounded rationality", the 
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mental operation implied by the SEU theory would exceed the processing limits of 
human being. Therefore, people would use different decision strategies to reduce the 
processing load and achieve “satisficing” but “optimizing’，results. Serving as an 
alternative to the EU theory, Kahenman & Tversky's (1979) prospect theory depicted 
risky choice process as two-phase process: editing and evaluation. In the first phase, 
decision problem was edited into a simpler representation of the problem, and 
evaluated in phase two to decide the prospect of decision outcome as gain or loss 
relative to the aspiration level. Heuristics were used to simplify the task and simulated 
the decision quality of the EU model. 
Due to the use of heuristics, decision-making is highly affected by task 
characteristics, such as complexity, time demand, information display, and 
alternatives available (Payne, 1985). At the same time, cognition studies had been 
dominated by the use of relatively small number of laboratory tasks to investigate 
extensively mechanism or rules in particular stages. Such decomposed or simplified 
representation of real-world decisions had caused criticism in their relevance fNeisser, 
1976). Also, literature suggested that heuristics could be accurate but no single 
heuristics do well across all contexts. Decision-makers had to choose or combine a 
repertoire of strategies so that a high level of accuracy could be maintain with a 
minimum effort (Johnson & Payne, 1985; Maule, 1985). Hence, understanding in the 
features of high-level cognitive skills in coordination and interaction of activities 
between stages is more important (Simon, 1979). 
The above discussion suggested that decision-makers adopted different strategies 
(a combination of heuristics) to cope with different task demands. It hence supported 
the interactionist perspective from a theoretical standpoint. Given the study of 
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interaction is worthwhile, a question followed should be asked: How context and 
individual characteristics affected the coordination and interaction of the decision 
activities in the decision-making process? 
Frameworks for Task and Context Effects 
To answer the above question, Payne (1985) identified three frameworks for 
handling task and context effects: a) cost/benefit principles; b) perceptual processes; 
and c) adaptive production systems. 
The cost/benefit framework assumed that the selection of a particular decision 
strategy in a particular task environment was a deliberate effort to produce an accurate 
response and the strategy demand for mental resources or effort (Beach & Mitchell, 
1978; Russo & Dosher, 1980). The cost/benefit framework maintained the assumption 
of calculated rationality on the part of the decision-maker, and certain task effects 
were very consistent with a cost/benefit framework. 
The perceptual framework stated that people's choices were incautiously 
affected by the framing of information and its potential effects on the relative 
attractiveness of options (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). As Payne (1985) put it: “It is difficult to see how such wording changes 
increase either cognitive effort or the desire for accuracy." 
Adapted from Pitz's (1977) production systems perspective, the adaptive 
production systems consisted of a set of productions, a task environment, and a 
working memory. The productions specified a set of actions and conditions under 
which they occurred. Therefore, the system could be endowed with learning abilities, 
and decision strategies could be decomposed into sets of elementary information 
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processes (EIPs) (Payne, 1985). 
Although Payne (1985) argued that the adaptive production system perspective is 
superior in explaining the task and context effect, it had three shortcomings. First, the 
production system conceptualization is very general. There were no specific rules or 
EIP identified. Therefore, it provided little explanation or prediction power on choice 
behavior. Second, it called for studies of the elementary information processes. That is 
difficult to study, verify and yield little contribution to the understanding of higher-
level cognitive skills - coordination and interaction of decision activities. Third, the 
system did not consider the characteristics of the decision-makers, such as emotions. 
Nonetheless, the three frameworks may not be mutually exclusive. Even Payne 
(1985) suggested that risky decision behavior was likely to consist of multiple 
systems that interact in various way. Cost/benefit analysis could be one of decision 
rules in the production system. In fact, Forgas (1989) had used the production system 
to explain the effects of moods on choice behavior by suggesting some decision rules. 
Decision-making as a Conflict Resolution Process 
The original cost/benefit perspective focused primarily on the cognitive demand 
of a task. The emotional consequence of choice is ignored. As suggested by Hogarth 
(1987), the process of information selection, evaluation, and choice is a conflict 
resolution process. Decision-makers have to trade off not only values on different 
dimensions of alternatives, but also the mental costs and benefits of engaging in the 
decision process itself. Under the notion of bounded rationality, the guiding principle 
of such a complex interactive process is the trade-off of costs and benefits of mental 
effort relative to decision-makers ‘ emotional state against the choice context. 
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Therefore, basic operations of information processing are often affected by emotional 
factors. 
The concept of conflict resolution highlighted the conflicts introduced by 
cost/benefit tradeoff. Another merit is that it pointed out the emotional stress and 
satisfaction accompanied by such a tradeoff. If we add the emotional dimension, the 
cost/benefit analysis then may not necessarily a conscious process as described by 
original model. Emotions affect the judgment process by simplifying the processes 
(Elster, 1998). To illustrate, if a decision-maker felt that he / she would be upset by 
choosing alternative A, he / she might reject this alternative without further evaluation 
of this alternative. 
In other words, the traditional cost/benefit analysis focused on the tradeoff 
between the current cost (mental cost of problem solving), and the expected benefits 
(such as decision efficiency, and quality). Including the emotional dimension, 
however, introduces the calculation of psychic costs/benefks - the expectation of the 
emotional consequence resulted from a particular choice. If a choice outcome is 
expected to be favorable, the emotional benefits increase, and the desirability of that 
decision option increases, or vice versa. The generalized cost/benefit calculation then 
is to compare the future benefits (practical and emotional) of the choice with the 
present costs of engaging in the decision-making. 
Generalized Cost/Benefit Analysis 一 the Emotional Dimension 
By including the emotional dimensions, the cost/benefit framework could have 
strong explanation power. To illustrate, the production framework did not address the 
issue or the mechanism why certain conditions should lead to certain decisions. The 
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mental and emotional costs/benefits could provide the guiding principles. It could also 
explain why perception affected choices as suggested by the perceptual framework. 
When a choice was better than expectation (i.e., framed positively), it increased the 
emotional benefits of that particular choice, so that the choice was more appealing; 
when a choice was worse than expectation (i.e., framed negatively), emotional costs 
associated with the responsibility of the choice increased, that choice was avoided. 
Moreover, the notion of loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), breakeven 
effect (Thaler & Johnson, 1985), pride-seeking and regret-avoidance (Thaler, 1980; 
Bell, 1984, 1985) could all be explained under the emotional cost/benefit perspective. 
Taking loss will arouse intensive negative emotion, and therefore are difficult to 
executive due to such internal conflict. 
In addition, Atkinson (1957) proposed that the appeal of an alternative depended 
on the subject's dispositions toward achieving success and avoiding failure. This 
conflict was prominent in many decision situations (Coombs & Avmnin，1977). And 
the motivational determinants of behavior had been proven quite generative (Atkinson, 
1983). We could find that Atkinson's (1957) powerful theory could easily be 
understood under the emotional cost/benefit perspective. 
Given the strong explanatory power of the generalized cost/benefit analysis, one 
following question need to be answer is "How do people define psychic costs and 
benefits?" 
Literature suggested that people are pleasure seeking and displeasure avoiding. 
As Elster (1998) noted: "Generating occasions for pleasant emotions is a major part of 
people's lives." And “To prevent undesirable emotions, we may either ensure that the 
event that might trigger them do not occur or that, if they do, we do not come to know 
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about them." Accordingly, emotional satisfaction maybe a stronger motivator of 
people's action than the actual payoff itself. Mood management, i.e., people are 
pleasure seeking and displeasure avoiding, should be a guiding principle of people's 
cost/benefit calculation. For example，to avoid feeling guilty, or to feel good being a 
nice person, people may be willing to pay the cost, for example, giving up money to 
help, say, a beggar. People may also choose avoiding such encounter by changing to 
other routes (Elster，1998). In either case, people's decisions were influenced by the 
emotional distraction resulted by an option. 
In fact, mood management is evident from literature on social psychology, 
clinical psychology, environmental psychology, communication and marketing (Sin, 
1993). By giving a guiding principle of pleasure seeking and displeasure avoiding, we 
could then better understand how conflict is resolved. In other words, the mood 
management principle helps defining what is "cost" or "benefits." 
Summary 
Summarizing discussions in the literature review, literature suggests that risky 
decision making is highly contingent upon the interaction of the decision context and 
the characteristics of the decision-maker. The important issue of the interaction and 
coordination of different information processing stages had been highlighted. As 
decision making is a conflict resolution process, a complete understanding of risky 
choice requires exploring both its cognitive and emotional determinants. After 
reviewing existing theoretical frameworks, I proposed a generalized cost/benefit 
perspective, which included emotional dimensions into the conflict resolution process. 
Moreover, the mood management principle, i.e., people is pleasure seeking and 
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displeasure avoiding, was identified as the guiding principle of the generalized 





In the following sessions, I will use the psychic cost/benefit perspective to 
integrate fragmented and contradicting findings on affects' role on cognitive processes 
and propose a set of hypothesis for testing. For hypothesis testing, Pedhazur & 
Schmelkin (1991) stressed the importance of entertaining multiple alternative 
hypotheses about a phenomenon of interest. Due to the lack of understanding on the 
interaction between task context and decision-maker characteristics, existing findings 
on the role of emotions on information processing is fragmented and contradicting. As 
a result, competing hypotheses were deducted from existing literature. The discussion 
would follow each stages of the decision-making process before evaluating the final 
results of the processes. 
Information Acquisition 
Restrained by limited information-processing capacities, people's perception of 
information is selective. Typically, people will “ see only what they want to see." 
Therefore, emotions may induce biasjudgments (Hogarth, 1987). 
Moreover, willingness to confront or avoid conflicts makes people use different 
strategies. Conflict-confronting or compensatory strategies consider all relevant 
information and produce more deliberate and accurate choice. Such strategies are 
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difficult to execute as they highlight the emotional conflicts of choice. Conflict-
avoidance or non-compensatory strategies, on the other hand, are easier to execute 
because they simplify decision by acquiring information more selectively. As a result, 
they may produce choices which do not reflect true preferences of decision-makers 
(Hogarth, 1987). 
On the other hand, literature on the influence of affect on cognitive processes 
shows contrasting results and suggests that its effects are also task and situation 
dependent (Mann 1992). The mood-memory models (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) suggests 
that affect influences perception and interpretation of risk events through automatic 
priming of mood-congruent thoughts and memories. Ideas and memories of similar 
emotional" tone tend to be linked in memory as a network (Bower, 1981). As a result, 
pleased people are more prone to be optimistic in their decisions and can recall 
positive materials better, while displeased people are inclined to recall better negative 
items, think about losses and hassles associated with the choice alternatives, and to 
put off action. 
However, the mood-memory model fails to explain several phenomena. First, the 
mood-memory model states that moods bring to mind events and memories linked to 
that emotion. Therefore, the effect of moods should be the strongest for highly similar 
events in the memory networks. On the contrary, Johnson and Tversky, (1983) found 
that negative mood increased the risk perception about not only related, but also a 
wide array ofunrelated hazards. That was difficult to explain under the mood-memory 
model. Also, the mood-congruent effect of negative affect is more variant than those 
of positive affect (see Isen & Baron 1991; Fiske & Taylor, 1991 for review). That 
suggested that there might be different mechanism governing the response to positive 
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or negative mood, which was not accounted for by the mood-memory model. Third, 
pleased subjects did not acted optimistically as predicted by the mood-memory model. 
Instead, they were more risk-averse in the high- and moderate-risk conditions, but are 
risk-taking in the low risk condition (Isen and Geva, 1987). Such task-specific 
response also suggested more complex response mechanism than what mood-memory 
model described. 
Forgas's (1989) suggested a rule-based model for better account for the mood 
effects on complex personal decisions. Following the production systems framework 
(Pitz, 1977), the rule-based model regards decision making is a context-dependent 
social activity governed by rules and strategies that are produced automatically when 
certain antecedent conditions, such as affective states, are present (see Mann, 1992 for 
review). However, Forgas did not provide specific decision rules. As discussed earlier, 
his model could be perfectly put into the psychic cost/benefit perspective. 
One rule is mood maintenance suggested by Isen and Geva (1987). Pleased 
people become risk-averse in order to maintain their positive mood state. Similarly, 
displeased people try to improve their affective state by staying away from negative 
memory or thoughts. As a result, they minimize the mood congruent effect. That is 
consistent with the notion of mood management effort. 
Negative Information 
According to the mood management and psychic cost/benefit perspective, affect 
may not only affect the encoding and learning of information, but as early as at the 
information acquisition stage. Specifically, pleased people may avoid negative 
information to maintain their mood; displeased people may also avoid negative 
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information to avoid worsening their mood. Michael Marcus in Market Wizard 
(Schwager, 1989, p45) illustrated the difficulty in taking negative information: “I am 
very open-minded. I am willing to take in information that is difficult to accept 
emotionally, but which I still recognize to be true." Since negative information is 
difficult 0 accept emotionally, happy people and unhappy people in particular, may be 
inclined to refuse or ignore them. 
That is because negative information introduces more conflicting cues for the 
decision. Increase in uncertainty arouses higher stress level in problem solving, and 
increases the mental costs of choice in terms of mental effort and negative affect. 
Decision-makers may thus use the conflict-avoiding or non-compensatory 
strategies to avoid any direct conflicts involved in evaluating difficult emotional 
aspects of choice. Negative information then can be ignored consciously or 
unconsciously by the decision-maker. For example, positive mood was found to 
induce poorer task performance when processing persuasive messages (Mackie & 
Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987). That could be explained that persuasive 
message had more direct emotional impact than facts. Positive affect triggered the 
effort to eliminate emotional damages of the persuasive and negative message by 
ignoring them; as a result, performance was dampened. Therefore, hypothesis la and 
2a are stated as follows: 
Hla: Positive affect group will spend less time in acquiring negative 
information comparing to the neutral affect group. 
H2a: Negative affect group will spend less time in acquiring negative 
information comparing to the neutral affect group. 
On the other hand, research also shows that positive affect enhances efficiencies 
in information selection and choice through integrative organization of problem-
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related and decision-related information. Works by Isen and others found that pleased 
subjects, though used the elimination-by-aspects strategy, a non-compensatory 
strategy, made similar choice as comparing to control group, but were able to 
eliminate trivial dimensions, rechecked less information, and took less time. 
Enhancement of efficiency without sacrificing decision quality was found in car 
selection (Isen & Means, 1983) and clinical problem solving (Isen, Rosenzweig, & 
Young, 1991). 
Also, pleased people are found to better differentiate and categorize information, 
indicative of cognitive flexibility (Murray, et aL, 1990). And Forgas (1989) found that 
pleased subjects were inclined to employing more efficient strategy - elimination by 
aspect - and search more task-related information than displeased subjects, but did not 
differ from neutral subjects. 
Hence positive affect is suggested to interact with task characteristic to influence 
task performance. When the task is important, allows for creative processing, and 
provides feedback, positive affect may stimulate efficient information processing and 
enhance task performance. When the task is trivial and boring, positive mood may 
lead to error-prone heuristics that impede task performance. However, such 
proposition has not been put to test in decision context whereby major gain and losses 
are involved (Mann, 1992). 
Investment decisions clearly are "interesting" yet "important" decisions. If 
pleased subjects could eliminate irrelevant information effectively, and focus on 
useful information, selective information searching actually enhances efficiency, and 
results in less bias. That is possible if pleased subjects do not want a poor decision to 
impair their mood, especially when the task is important. Therefore, there should be 
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no difference from both pleased subjects and neutral subjects in the selection of 
negative information. Therefore, another competing hypothesis is proposed as 
follows: 
Hlb: There is no difference in the time spent in negative information 
between positive and neutral groups. 
In the case of negative affect, literature shows that when making important and 
personal relevant decision, displeased subjects could overcome their mood state and 
perform efficiently than pleased or neutral subjects. They are also very cautious, 
indicative of rechecking information, selective attention to risks, and making risk-
avoiding choices (Mann, 1992). To improve their mood, top priority of displeased 
subject is to make correct decisions, so that the emotional consequence of the outcome 
is positive, instead of negative. Therefore, displeased people should have a strong 
incentive to pay more attention to risk factors, i.e., negative information. Clearly, this 
is a tradeoff between current emotional costs of taking in negative information with 
the future benefit of improved mood. We can expect that the more important the task, 
the greater the willingness to take in negative information. As suggested by successful 
traders, being open-minded is critical for sound judgment. In line with this argument, 
there should also be no difference shown in the selection of negative information 
between neutral and displeased subjects. Therefore, Hypothesis 2b proposes that 
negative affect should not cause bias in information selection: 
H2b: There is no difference in the time spent in acquiring negative 
information between the negative and neutral affect group. 
Positive and Irrelevant Information 
As discuss above, mood management efforts may promote both pleased and 
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displeased people to use conflict-avoiding strategies. Neutral people, who have less 
need to manage their current mood, may use conflict-confronting strategies. In this 
way, both pleased and displeased people need less information and mental effort in 
reaching their decisions. Comparing with neutral group, positive and negative affect 
groups should spend less time in positive information, and particularly, irrelevant 
information. As mentioned above, literature has shown that positive affect promotes 
simplified information search, that is faster, more selective, and less redundant search 
(Mann, 1992). The hypotheses for information acquisition of positive and irrelevant 
information can be stated as: 
H3: Positive affect group will spend less time than the neutral group in 
acquiring positive information. 
H4: Positive affect group will spend less time than the neutral group in 
acquiring irrelevant information. 
The effect of negative mood here is again more complex. If negative mood 
impedes efficiency in information processing due to the reluctance to make decision, 
as research suggests (Mann, 1992), displeased people should take more time, if not 
less, than neutral people even though they may be using con-compensatory strategies. 
However, investment decision is extremely personal and important. Displeased 
subjects may be motivated to solve the investment decision so that their mood can be 
improved. In other words, by putting more efforts in thinking, displeased people can 
minimize their psychological regret if the chosen alternative tums out to be 
unfavorable, "because it is hard to live with yourself if you take an important decision 
casually and it backfires" (Hogarth, 1987). 
Therefore, as the importance of the decision increases, mental effort should be 
intensified, and accordingly enhances efficiency in decision making. For example, 
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William Eckhardt in New Market Wizard (Schwager, 1992, p.l33) suggested: "If 
you're worried, channel that energy into research." Therefore, it is very likely that the 
task effect will out-weight the effect of negative mood. Two sets of competing 
hypotheses are stated as: 
H5a: Negative affect group will take more time than the neutral group in 
acquiring positive information. 
H5b: Negative affect group will spend less time than the neutral group in 
acquiring positive information. 
H6a: Negative affect group will spend more time than the neutral group in 
acquiring irrelevant information. 
H6b: Negative affect group will spend less time than the neutral group in 
acquiring irrelevant information. 
Evaluation and Judgment 
In light of the discussion above, if moods induce highly selective information 
acquisition, both pleased and displeased people will only have biased information 
available for their decision making. That should lead to bias in their reasoning process. 
Neutral people should be more objective as they would integrate both negative and 
positive information in their decision making. Their reasoning process should be more 
comprehensive comparing with both positive and negative affect groups. 
Suppose moods do not influence information acquisition as competing 
hypotheses argued, the question is then whether mood affects information retrieval. 
Literature suggests that encoding and retrieval biases may act independently (Sinclair, 
1988). Regarding the retrieval bias, the mood congruent effect suggests that positive 
affect will lead to better recall of positive information. 
Moreover, positive affect promotes the simplifying of decision and use of 
heuristics. Pleased people may fail to fully understand the implications of their 
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information set and rush to decision. As a result, positive affect causes overlooking of 
important information (Baron, 1994). This argument is consistent with research 
findings that positive affect results in broader categorization of information when 
compared to the control group (Isen and Daubman, 1984), and less accuracy in 
decision making of performance appraisal (Sinclair, 1988). In this case, positive affect 
may lead to sacrificing decision quality for the sake of efficiency. 
On the other hand, most of the literature agrees that positive affect improves 
efficiency and performance of solving complex problems by enhancing creativity, the 
configural, integrative thinking and integrating of information dimensions in the 
reasoning process (e.g., Isen and Baron, 1991; Fiske and Taylor, 1991, Mann 1992). 
And creativity is critical for predictive judgment because it requires the ability to 
imagine possible outcomes, and assess the relative likelihood of different outcomes 
(Hogarth, 1987). In this regard, even though pleased people may be selective in their 
information searching, they may be able to find out and weight important cues from 
information set and achieve high decision quality without sacrificing efficiency. 
According to above discussions, the hypotheses for positive affect are state as: 
H7: Positive affect group takes less time than the neutral group to make 
decisions. 
H8a: Positive affect group has less complex reasoning process than the 
neutral group. 
H8b: Positive affect group has equal complex reasoning process with the 
neutral group. 
H9a: Positive affect group makes more correct decisions than the neutral 
group. 
H9b: Positive affect group makes less correct decisions than the neutral 
group. 
The mood congruent effect on negative affect has been unreliable as it is 
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intervened by people's mood management effort. However, consistent with research 
on depression, negative mood is associated with cautious and inefficient information 
processing, selective attention to risks at the expense of benefits, reluctance to choose, 
and in many cases, self-defeating choices (Mann, 1992). That implies that displeased 
people are difficult to have comprehensive understanding of the decision context, 
giving too much weight on negative information, and lead to poor decision quality. 
However, studies by Sinclair and others also found that comparing with 
pleased subjects, displeased subjects made highly differentiated categorizations of 
information, more discrete judgment, and greatest accuracy in decision making in 
performance appraisal (Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair and Mark, 1986). That means even 
though displeased people have selective information set, they may be able to 
differentiate important information cues and put more weights accordingly in forming 
their decision. 
On the other hand, when they are dealing with personal-relevant decision, 
efficiency of displeased people can be improved. That indicates effort to overcome 
their mood state (Forgas, 1987). That is consistent with the argument that displeased 
people may put more effort to avoid sloppy decision - the negative consequence will 
dampen their mood even further. Also, by using conflict-avoiding strategies, they can 
reduce mental efforts and speed up their decision making process. Hypotheses for 
negative affect group thus are proposed as follows: 
HlOa: Negative affect group takes more time than the neutral group to make 
decisions. 
HlOb: Negative affect group takes less time than the neutral group to make 
decisions. 
H11: Negative affect group has less comprehensive reasoning process than 
the neutral group. 
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H12a: Negative affect group makes more correct decisions than the neutral 
group. 
H12b: Negative affect group makes less correct decisions than the neutral 
group. 
Strategies Formulation 
Positive affect is reported to encourage wise risk taking. Specifically, when the 
odd of winning is high, or the prospect of loss is not salient, positive affect encourages 
risk-taking; when the risk of losing is high, positive affect actually promotes risk-
averse behavior. In addition, pleased people think more about losses and losing in the 
high risk and moderate risk conditions, but fewer thoughts about losing in the low risk 
condition (Isen & Geva, 1987). 
It is explained that pleased people possess greater negative utility for potential 
losses, and the need for mood maintenance. As a result, pleased people are inclined to 
seek protection against loss (Isen, Nygren, & Ashby，1988; Isen & Baron, 1991). Such 
finding is consistent with theory that pleased people evaluate the prospects of risk 
decision regarding its potential cost and benefits to their emotional states (Hogarth,, 
1987) - seeking protection against loss can limit the potential losses; while taking 
good risk can maximize the potential gain both materially and psychologically. To 
illustrate, if pleased people do not take, or take less risk when the odds are favorable, 
they may feel regret for wasting the opportunity to be better off. Therefore, they 
should be more inclined to use limit-loss order to limit potential loss. 
In the investment context, the odds of winning or losing are not clearly available 
as most of the experimental studies do (e.g., Isen & Geva, 1987). Instead, they are 
estimated subjectively by the investor. Since investors can take no action before they 
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have not decided if the market will go up or down, once they have make up their mind, 
they should be confident in their decision. Also, pleased people are more optimistic, 
they may think more about maximizing profit potential. They should increase 
investment sizes. Stanley Drunckenmiler in New Market Wizard (Schwager, 1992, 
p.l97) illustrated this point that "It's my philosophy, which has been reinforced by Mr. 
Soros, that when you eam the right to be aggressive, you should be aggressive." In 
this regard, pleased subjects should avoid using limit-profit order to let their profit run. 
Hypotheses on positive affect thus are: 
H13: Positive affect group uses more iimit-loss orders than the neutral group 
H14: Positive affect group uses less limit-profit orders than the neutral group 
H15: The investment size of positive affect group is larger than of the neutral 
group. 
As discussed earlier, negative affect lead to cautiousness, selective attention to 
risk at the expense of benefits, and risk-avoiding choices (Mann, 1992). That should 
result in sub-optimal investment strategies. Specifically, in order to limit potential 
losses, displeased people should use more limit-loss orders, decrease their investment 
size, and use more limit-profit orders to secure their profit. Only in this way, they 
have the highest possibility of improving their mood, or at least not worsening it. 
Therefore, hypotheses for negative affect are proposed as: 
H16: Negative affect group uses more limit-loss orders than the neutral 
group 
H17: Negative affect group uses more limit-profit orders than the neutral 
group. 




The above discussion has yielded a lot of competing hypotheses regarding the 
role of affects on the investment decision-making processes. It then becomes a 
difficult task to predict how affects influence trading performance. Nonetheless, we 
can do this by speculating which stages of decision-making process are more 
important to better decision making, thus better trading performance. 
Suppose that information selection is more important, emotional neutrality 
should lead to better decision, thus the best results. As it is argued that pleased people 
will have larger investment size, their performance shall be even worse than the 
cautious displeased people. That is consistent with successful traders' experience (e.g. 
Schwager, 1989, 1992; 0'Nell, 1995). For example, the legendary investor Jesse 
Livermore pointed out average investors' mistake (Lefevre, 1976) that “ he merely 
hopes e therefore runs much greater risks than he would if he were speculating 
intelligently, in accordance with opinions or beliefs logically arrived at after a 
dispassionate study of underlying conditions." 
If information-processing strategies are more important, positive affect should 
yield the best results. That is because it promotes optimal and creative information 
searching and integration, and lead to better decisions. Moreover, positive affect 
promotes creativity and flexibility, and helping people to avoiding the "escalation of 
commitment" error (Isen & Baron，1991). If positive affect can help people avoiding 
the tendency to invest more in poor investments, that may result in the best trading 
performance. In fact, such flexibility demonstrates the rationality contrasting with 
what Prospect Theory predicts, and depicts successful traders' behavior (Schwager, 
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1989, 1992). For instance, William 0'Nell (1995) pointed out that “The whole secret 
to winning in the stock market is to lose the least amount when you're not right." 
Even though negative affect may promote more discrete and accurate decision 
making than positive and neutral affect, it also lead to sub-optimal investment 
strategies, and therefore sub-optimal trading performance. In line with this argument, 
positive affect should lead to best results, while neutral affect should lead to the worst 
results. 
Hypotheses on trading performance are stated as follows: 
H19: Investment performance is positively influenced by the interaction 
between investors' decision and investment size. 
H20a: The performance of neutral group is better than of the negative affect 
group, of which is better than of the positive affect group. 
H20b: The performance of positive group is better than of the negative group, 





Ebbesen & Konecni (1980) criticized that many experimental studies on risky 
choice had very low external validity because those studies suffered from the 
following defects. First, probabilistic information was presented in clearly stated 
numbers. Second, decision tasks had been decomposed into the dimensions desirable 
to the researcher. Third, decision format was redefined to the structure of laboratory 
simulations. Forth, information was listed and possible order effect was ignored. 
Finally, subjects were told that their decisions were hypothetical and therefore had no 
monetary consequences. In short, existing studies do not realistically represent real-
world problems. Making experiment realistic is critical. To do that, this experiment 
uses real information and a realistic Internet trading system to represent the task, and 
bring in monetary incentives to induce subjects' psychological states similar to the 
real investment context. 
In this study, a laboratory experiment was used to test the hypotheses. The 
experiment was a 3 (affect) x 4 (round) factorial. Affect (positive, negative, and 
neutral) was between-subject factor. Within-subject factors are the individual stage of 
information process. 
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Affect was induced by a combination of two methods: (a) positive or negative 
performance feedback on a "free trial" prior to the main simulation task (e.g. Isen & 
Baron, 1991), and (b) positive or negative music (e.g., Eich & Metcalfe, 1989). 
In an Internet trading system which provided news and charts information about 
DEM / CHF, subjects predicted the price movement, and formulated their investment 
strategy for each round that lasts one to two months. Each news item was adapted and 
shortened from news in Dow Jones News Achieve in a way that it contained 
information only in one of the three categories: bullish, negative, or neutral / 
irrelevant. 
The system counted the number and time spent in positive, negative and 
irrelevant news items to measure information acquisition. Time spent in decision, 
correctness of the decision and complexity were used to measure information 
processing; investment amounts, use of limit-loss and limit-profit order were used to 
measure investment strategy; and profits were used to measure trading performance. 
Care was taken to eliminate possible effects of the experimental settings on 
results. Before the main experiment, pretests of news and experiment stimuli used 
were conducted to ensure that they were appropriate for this study. 
Material and Apparatus Selection 
Selection of Music 
Apart from giving positive or negative feedback on a free-trial task, music was 
used as .one of the treatments to create and maintain the mood state of the 
experimental groups. The use of music for mood manipulation has been successful in 
marketing and psychology studies (e.g., Eich and Metcalfe, 1989; Sin, 1993). 
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Unlike most single-task studies, this experiment involved making a series of 
decisions and took about an hour. The effect of manipulation from performance 
feedback may subside as time moved on. Wining or losing may also affect the mood 
state of a subject. Therefore, music albums with consistent affective tone were 
selected in order to maintain the designated mood. 
Kenny G,s album Moment was selected according to the suggestion of an 
experienced foreign exchange trader who felt it very “ uplifting ’，. It is used for the 
positive affect group. The negative music selected based on my personal experience 
was Rite of Spring by Igor Stavinsky. According to the album introduction, it was and 
still is a very controversial music piece, which creates “ permanent deception through 
constantly weak stresses” And it even caused fighting in the audiences during its 
premiere in 1913 (Hans-Christian Schmidt, 1991). 
Before the pretest, I consulted with a marketing professor who was adept in 
music, and received support for using the selected music for mood manipulation. 
Figure 1. DEM/CHF Movement during the Experiment Period 
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Selection of Currency Pair 
The currency pair selected was a European cross rate: Mark / Swiss (DEM / CHF) 
between the period of January 1996 to October 1996 (see Figure 1). 
According to Bill Lispschuts in New Market Wizard (Schwager, 1992), “Foreign 
exchange is a very psychological market." Foreign exchange market provides a good 
context of investment decisions. The first reason of choosing Marky^Swiss was that 
Germany and Switzerland were two influential countries and there were sufficient 
news affecting Mark / Swiss movement. 
Second, since the study used real news and price movement, controlling the 
effect of prior knowledge on experiment results was critical to study how predictions 
and strategies were made. In addition, Mark / Swiss is a neglected, though important 
cross-rate, in Hong Kong, according to a professor who was heavily involved in the 
foreign exchange market. 
Lastly, during the period, Mark / Swiss moved from a zigzag style to a rally. The 
correct strategy for each round was to buy - sell - buy - buy. Subjects have to re-
evaluate their forecast and strategies in each round. Sticking to the buy or sell side 
would lead to disastrous trading performance. Moreover, the price changed in each 
round was about 0.2 franc; with the same investment size, the profit or loss in each 
round was approximately equal. Therefore, round factors would not affect the overall 
trading performance. 
The starting date of each round vvas set to be critical dates of the D E M / C H F 
movement , which means that the currency pair was moving around a turning point or 
an important support or resistance level. Subjects thus had io decide whether price 
would continue to fo l low the existing trend, or would reversed it. The t ime span 
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between each round was about two months. So subjects did not need to consider 
short-term volatility. 
System for Trading Simulation 
An Internet trading system was set up to simulate the above trading and record 
measurements mentioned. The experiment could be administrated at a computer lab 
and use the system through computer terminals. The advantage is two-fold. First, 
subjects were already familiar with the physical as well as the computer environment 
and would work with the computer as usual. Possible effects of an “ artificial “ 
laboratory setting were eliminated. Second, it made experiment administration easier. 
The system had two web pages for each round, namely, the News & Charts page, 
and the Placing Order page. In the News & Charts page, subjects could click on a 
news headline to view the news content, or click on a chart to view the daily chart in 
detail. 
Note that all news headlines were shown in the screen so that the order of 
information display would not affect subjects' information encoding and retrieval, i.e., 
the priming effect (Payne, 1985). The charts depicted the daily closing prices in the 
previous three years. The number of data in each chart, and the chart layout are kept 
constant to eliminate possible effect due to the chart presentation. An example of the 
system is shown in Appendix 2. 
In order to trace what news a subject read and the time spent, each news allowed 
only be viewed once. The effect of artificiality shall be minimal, as subjects would be 
under time constraints to read the news. No time limit was set in the experiment, so 
subjects could arrange their time in the experiment. Also, subjects were told that they 
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were free to read as many news items as preferred before reaching their decisions, just 
like in the real-world situation. 
After the trading decision was made, a subject could click on the [Placing Order 
button to enter the Placing Order page. In this page, subjects could select to buy or sell 
with investment size ranging from $100,000 to $1,000,000. They could also place 
stop-loss and / or stop-profit order. They were required to briefly state their rationale 
for their decision. The layout of this page is shown in Appendix 2. The initial capital 
was set to be 1 million. That ensured all subjects' capital would be positive. The effect 
of gain / loss domain on risk-taking described by the prospect theory was therefore 
controlled. 
Before the actual trading simulation started, the system provided a "free trial" 
section. It was set up for the following purposes: First, it helped subjects familiar with 
the computer system and the task, so that their performance and time measurements 
would not be affected by misuse of the computer system. Second, it manipulated 
subjects' affect by giving positive, neutral, or negative feedback on performance. 
Selection ofNews Items 
After the date of each round is determined, daily currency market reports for the 
whole trading period from leading financial newspapers such as The Wall Street 
Journal and The Financial Times for example, were downloaded from Dow Jones 
News Archive. For each round, nine news were selected by evaluating their 
importance to the currency movement, and categorized as DEM/CHF bullish, bearish 
or neutral / irrelevant. Altogether thirty-six news items were selected. 
A typical news item described how the market moved, what factors were 
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affecting the market, e.g., the development of European Monetary Union (EMU), and 
finally provided different comments and predictions from practitioners, such as 
economists of leading investment banks. 
A news items was edited and shortened to within 200 words and contained only 
bullish, bearish or neutral message. The number of words in each category was kept to 
be similar so that possible influence on the time spent in each category was avoided. 
All news items were then sent to a professor who were experienced in the foreign 
exchange market to ensure that those news contained important information affecting 
the currency movement; and those news could be classified into the three categories. 
News items then were sent to a Senior Investment Manager for judging. Each 
news was measured by a 5-point scale from 1 (DEMy'CHF bullish) to 5 (DEM/CHF 
bearish). However, his ratings were far different from the meaning of the news. He 
explained that he was very busy and read the news during lunchtime; and he tried to 
guess my expected answer and whether the news had been actually "digested" by the 
market. 
Realizing that "second guessing" is a major problem, I sent the same news 
questionnaires to a fellow graduate student, and a Bachelor of Business 
Administration holder, who served as two new judges. Instructions were given as 
follows: 
"Please reading the following news items at your normal reading speed. Then please 
evaluate whether the meaning of the news is German Mark / Swiss Franc bullish, bearish, 
or neutral / irrelevant to either German Mark or Swiss Franc's movement. No second-
guessing is needed. 
For example, if you feel that the news indicating that German Mark will appreciate 
against Swiss Franc, i.e., German Mark bullish, then circle 1，or 2 according to your 
judgment of how strong the message is. On the contrary, if you feel that a news 
indicating that German Mark will depreciate against Swiss Franc, that means the news is 
German Mark bearish, then circle 4 or 5 according to your judgment 6f how strong the 
message is. If you find that the implication of the news is ambiguous, contradicting, or 
irrelevant to the German Mark / Swiss Franc movement, circle 3. 
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Note that you need not guess whether such news have been "discounted" by the market, 
or the researcher's intention. Thankyou.“ 
With clear instructions, mean ratings results were mostly agreed with my 
expectation, except for seven news items (see Appendix 1). Also, their rating were 
very convergent, with correlation r = .82. 
Those bullish news with mean rating not less than 2.5, bearish news not greater 
than 3.5, or neutral news not within the range of 2.5 to 3.5 were selected for revision 
until they could finally fulfill the above criteria. 
By asking judges the rationales for rating the selected news items, I found that 
their divergent views were due to lack of relevant background information. 
Accordingly, those news items were re-written by adding relevant background 
information or implications of the news. After that, they were sent to another two 
undergraduates ofbusiness major forjudge. After four times of revisions, all news got 
the desirable ratings as shown in Table 1. In other words, the mean rating of all bullish 
news items were smaller than 2.5, while all bearish news were larger than 3.5, and all 
irrelevant news items fell between 2.5 to 3.5. 
Pretest ofTreatments 
Before the pretest, I tested the trading system and played the two music albums 
to three professors from the department of International Business and Finance, 
including the one with substantial trading experience in the foreign exchange market. 
They found no problems in the materials used. Then the effects of two treatments, i.e., 
positive or negative performance feedback, and two kinds of music were tested before 
the main experiment was carried out. 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY QF NEWS ITEMS SELECTED  
Round One Round Two Round Three Round Four 
News Rating ® No. of Rating No. of Rating No. of Rating No. of 
Words Words Words Words 
1 5 f ^ 3 f ^ i r ^ 43 Y^ 
2 2 228 4 158 4.5 163 4 174 
3 5 181 1.5 184 3 197 4.5 139 
4 3 194 3 174 3 183 3 174 
5 2 166 4 189 4 186 1.5 168 
6 2 175 1.67 150 5 174 3 175 
7 3 172 4 147 2 167 1.5 182 
8 4 163 3 184 3 162 3 172 
9 3 231 1 128 2 162 1 173 
Bullish 5 ^ 4 ^ ^ 523 
Bearish 531 494 523 478 
Neutral 597 550 542 521 
Total 1697 1506 1577 1522 
Price High 0.829 ^ 0 ^ 0.8501 
Price Low 0.805 0.81 0.81 0.83 
Price Last 0.8049 0.8258 0.8074 0.8290 
PriceChg.b 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.021 
Note: Z 1 = DEM/CHF bullish, 5 = DEM/CHF bearish. ‘ 
b. Price change = price difference between this round and the next round. 
Subjects 
Forty-four business undergraduates voluntarily participated in the pretest and 
were given cash incentive. Among them, 28 (63.6%) were female and 16 (36.4%) 
were male. They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions - positive affect fN" 
=23) or negative affect fN" = 21). Their task was to complete the free trial task and the 
first round of trading simulation. 
4 1 
Procedure 
Before the pretest started, subjects were told that there was another independent 
study on music; therefore, they would be required to fill in a "Music Appreciation" 
questionnaire by Sin (1992) and Russell's (1989) Affect Grid (Appendix 4). 
In the positive mood condition, subjects gained profit regardless of their decision 
in the “free trial." However, their retum amount was set to be 30 per cent of 
investment size in order to make the profit more realistic. To increase the vividness of 
the feedback, the following phase was used: "Yourjudgment is proven to be excellent! 
You just made $x00,000 in one trade!”. Conversely, in the negative condition, 
subjects lost regardless their decision in the “ free trial. “ And the loss amount was 
also set to be 30 per cent of investment size. They received a feedback as “Life 
sometimes is miserable! Youjust lost $x00,000 in one trade!" 
After the free trial, subjects were told that their results were randomly generated 
and real trading would begin. Then positive or negative music was played throughout 
the experiment on a CD player with two amplified speakers which produced good 
sound quality. After they finished the first round, they were asked to complete a 
questionnaire, debriefed and dismissed afterwards. 
Measures Russell's (1989) Affect Grid was used as repeated measures before the 
free trial, after the free trial (manipulation), and after the first round finished. Sin's 
(1992) questionnaire was used upon task completion. According to Sin (1992), the 
construct mood pleasure and mood arousal are reliably measured by the following 
four and three items in 7 -point scales, respectively. 
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Mood Pleasure: happy - unhappy 
pleasing - displeasing 
delighted - distressed 
joyful - depressing. 
Mood Arousal: stimulating - relaxing 
exciting - calm 
arousing - unarousing 
Reliability scores of the mood pleasure and mood arousal were reported to 
be .967 and .851 respectively. Therefore, the above items are used to measure mood 
pleasure and mood arousal (Sin, 1992). 
Manipulation Check - Pretest 
From my observation, the positive music could uplift subjects' affect. They felt 
easy and smile when were doing the task. One female subject even asked me the name 
of the album and said she liked to listen to the music when she was working. 
Conversely, negative music made subjects tightened their face, and one female 
participant reported that the music made her upset. Statistical analysis supported such 
observations as well. 
Likert scale measure 
Given the satisfactory reliability (a = .89 and .83 for mood pleasure and mood 
arousal respectively), item mean scores which measured both constructs after the 
experiment, were used to perform a t- test. Comparing to the negative group, positive 
group gave much better evaluation on music {M= 5.20 vs. 2.93, r(42) = 5.81), had 
more positive affect {M=A.16 vs. 2.95, t (42)=5.77) and less aroused {M= 5.71 vs. 
3.51, t{A2) = -6.89). As shown in the Table 2, manipulations were successful. 
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TABLE 2 
MEAN SCORES OF POSITIVE MUSIC AND NEGATIVE MUSIC  
Music N Music Evaluation Mood Pleasure Mood Arousal 
Negative 21 2.93 2.95 5.71 
(1.32) (0.99) (0.78) 
Positive 23 5.20 4.76 3.51 
(1.27) (1.09) (1.27) 
t - value -5.81 -5.77 6.89 
Note: All t - tests with df = 42，p < .001. 
Figures in ( ) are standard deviations. 
For Music Evaluation: 1 = unfavorable evaluation, 7 = favorable evaluation 
For Mood Pleasure: 1 = negative, 7 = positive 
For Mood Arousal: 1 = low, 7 = high 
Affect Grid measure 
Pleasantness Results from Affect Grid repeated measures also indicated that 
affect manipulation was successful (see Table 3). Though the pleasantness of entire 
sample did not change in three measures (M= 5.48, 5.45, 5.45 respectively), the 
moods of the two groups became divergent after the “ free trial" manipulation and 
maintained their moods when the first round of trading finished {M= 4.16 vs. 6.52). 
One event worth mentioning was in one section of the negative group. A 
temporary network problem made two subjects very annoyed and scored very 
negative affect even before the manipulation took place. Though keeping this two data 
still showed significant treatment effect (F(l,42) = 40.73, p < .001), pretest affective 
state had already different (M = 4.16 vs. 6.52, r(42) = -2.76, p < .01). Their Affect 
Grid data was considered extreme cases and deleted in data analysis. 
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TABLE 3 
REPEATED MEASURES RESULTS OF AFFECT GRID ON PLEASANTNESS 
Period Negative Positive Entire Sample 
(N = 19) (N = 23) (N = 42)  
Pretest 5.00 5.87 5.48 
(1.37) (1.18) (1.33) 
After Free Trail 4.21 6.48 5.45 
(1.13) (1.24) (1.64) 
After Round 1 4.16 6.52 5.45 
(1.46) (1.41) (1.85) 
Note: figures in ( ) are standard deviations 
1 = extremely unpleasant feeling, 9 = extremely pleasant feeling 
As shown in Table 4, the assumption of sphericity was held as Mauchly 
sphericity test is insignificant, W = .89343, p > .1. There was strong between-group 
effect on the positive and negative affect group (F(l,40) = 40.24, p < .001) and 
treatment by period interaction effect (F(2,80)= 5.86, p< .05). Lack of period effect 
(F(2,80) = A,p> .1) indicated that affective state of each group had been successfully 
maintained even after round one was finished. Music resisted the impact of profit or 
loss from actual trading. 
TABLE 4 
MANOVA RESULTS OF REPEATED MEASURES - PLEASANTNESS 
Effect d.f. MS F 
Treatment (1,40) 104.96 40.24 *** 
Period (2,80) 0.12 O.lO0^>.l ,n.s .) 
Treatment by Period (2,80) 7.28 5.86 ** 
Note: With two extreme cases included, interaction effect F(2,84) =5.69,p< .01 
** p<.05 
*** p<.OOl 
Arousal As shown in Table 5，the treatment effect on arousal was insignificant. 
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However, period effect was significant with F(2,80) = 3.59, p <.05, and led to 
significant treatment by period interaction effect, F(2,80) = 4.25,p < .05. 
TABLE 5 
MANOVA RESULTS OF REPEATED MEASURES - AROUSAL 
Effect 7j. MS J 
Treatment (1,40) 0.26 0.06 ( p > . l , n . s . ) 
Period (2,80) 4.10 3.59 ** 
Treatment by Period (2,80) 4.86 4.25 ** 
Note: ** /7<.05 
Consistent with Likert scale measure, negative music increased the arousal level 
{M = 6.26 vs. 5.37) while positive music decreased the arousal level (M= 5.76 vs. 
5.87). Those led to significant period effect (see Table 6). 
TABLE 6 
REPEATED MEASURES RESULTS OF AFFECT GRID ON AROUSAL 
Period Negative Positive Entire Sample 
(N = 19) (N = 23) (N 二 42) 
Pretest 5.05 5.52 5.31 
(1.03) (1.38) (1.24) 
After Free Trail 5.37 5.87 5.64 
(1.50) (1.69) (1.61) 
AfterRoundl 6.26 5.57 5.88 
(1.46) (1.73) (1.63) 
Note: figures in ( ) are standard deviations 
1 = extremely low arousal, 9 = extremely high arousal 
Convergent validity of measures 
Correlation analysis was used to test the convergent validity of Likert-scale 
measurement and the Affect Grid. Mood Pleasure displayed strong convergent 
validity with correlation r = .69,p < .001. However, the Likert scale measurement of 
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arousal was negatively correlated with both Mood Pleasure measures (r = -.55 and 
-.49 respectively, p < .05), but failed to correlated with the Mood Arousal score of the 
Affect Grid measure {r 二 .24,j^>.l). As the dependent variable in this study was affect, 
or pleasantness, Russell's Affect Grid was adopted for the main experiment for its 
simplicity and effectiveness. 
Summary 
No problem was found in the material selection after consulting professors in the 
respective area. Pretests also showed that the two manipulation methods had been 
successful. The Russell's (1989) Affect Grid was adopted as affect measures in the 
main experiment. In addition, there was no gender difference found. 
Estimation of Power and Optimal Sample Size 
for the Main Experiment 
Based on the pretest results, the power for a three-group ANOVA design was 
calculated. With n = 20 for each group, the power (l-/J) for a 二 .05 ranged from .71 
to .94 depending on which variance was used. The power achieved was encouraging 
as even the most conservative estimates achieved satisfactory power. 
The sample size for the main experiment thus was set to have a minimum of 60 
(20 X 3) and preferably about 72 (24 x 3) or higher. 
Main Experiment 
The materials and apparatus were the same with the pretest. 
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Subjects 
Subjects recruited were majoring in Finance or Economics, and had knowledge 
and experience in real or simulated investments. Participants received HK$60 upon 
finishing the experiment. To make the simulation more realistic with monetary 
consequence, cash prizes of HK$300 to $100 were granted to subjects with best three 
performances to motivate efforts. 
Sixty-six students participated in the main experiment, in which 32 students were 
male. There was no gender difference found as shown later in the Results. 
Among them, 53% participants reported experience in trading stocks, and 45.5% 
in currencies. No one had involved in Mark / Swiss before. Therefore, prior 
knowledge in the currency pair was minimal among the subjects. Regarding their 
investment approach, 21.2% used fundamental analysis, 3.0% used technical analysis, 
24.2% used both, and 9.1% used econometrics. Lastly, 16.7% would seek "tips" for 
investment. They on average had taken 3.15 finance courses. Their average 
investment experience was 5.3 months; standard deviation was 10.04. 
Procedure 
Participants were formed into small groups of less than 8 people and randomly 
assigned to the positive, negative, or the control group. To avoid knowing others' 
results, subjects were instructed to sit separately. Before started, a male research 
assistant briefed them about the investment tasks and told that the study was together 
with an independent study on music. Then subjects accessed the trading system 
through Internet. 
After filling in background information, and a mood measurement questionnaire, 
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music started playing on the same CD player. Participants then completed the free 
trial section, which served as one treatment, and an opportunity for subjects to clarify 
problems related to the investment task and the system. Subjects updated their affect 
measures and a self-efficacy measure after the free trial. After all participants had their 
questions clarified, they started the trading simulation on-line. Their questions were 
also clarified during the experiment. Their questions related to rule of the game, 
system environment, and the meaning of "buy" or "sell." They updated their affect 
measure when finishing each round. 
After finishing the simulation, they filled in the questionnaire evaluating the 
simulation, the music, and guessed the true purpose of the study. Only four subjects 
related investment with emotions. Examining their responses I found that their mood 
states were not affected by the manipulation. Even so, their data were deleted from 
subsequent data analysis. Then subjects were debriefed with a written note and 
dismissed. 
Measures of Studied Variables 
Affect Two measures were used as repeated measures. The first was Russell's 
(1989) Affect Grid and the second was Likert-scale measure by Baron and Bronfen 
(1994). The reliability of the Likert-scale measure was reported to have Cronbach a 
=.86 and .71 for the two factors generated. It measures current affect in 7-point 
Likert-scale namely, sad-happy, bad-good, negative-positive, unpleasant-pleasant, 
tired-energetic, dull-alert, sleepy-awake and bored-interested. 
Information acquisition Subjects' time spent in reading each news item, and 
number of items read were counted by the computer system and summed up into 
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bullish, neutral and bearish categories. For analysis, the data were transformed as 
positive, neutral and negative. Positive information was news consistent with a 
subject's decision, i.e., if a subject chose "sell", all bearish news items read were 
treated as positive, and vice versa. 
Judgment was measured by correctness, complexity, and time spent to reach a 
decision. The complexity construct measured the degree the decision-maker integrated 
positive and negative information. It tried to differentiate different mental efforts 
made in making judgments. Intuitive judgment uses the fewest effort and is not 
effective. Conflict-avoidance strategies, which primarily analyze positive information, 
resulted in more complex decision-making. The conflict-confronting strategies 
required the greatest efforts because both positive and negative information were 
considered, weighted, and integrated (Hogarth, 1987). Subjects' responses were coded 
into a six-point scale accordingly (see Appendix 3). 
Performance Subjects' profit or loss achieved in each round was used as 
measures of trading performance in each round. 
Control Variables 
Gender Mixed results suggested that gender affected investment decision-
making (Bromiley & Curley, 1992). 
Experience Studies showed that investment professionals used different evaluation 
criteria from individual investors (Bromiley & Curley, 1992). Investment experience 
may lead to better skills in solving investment problems and strategy formulation. 
Self-efficacy Giving positive or negative feedback in "free trial" may affect the self-
efficacy of subjects, and thus their performance (Cervone et al, 1994). A self-efficacy 
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measure was used. It asked subjects to indicate “yes” or “no” to whether or not they 
couM achieve 5 different profit levels. For each confidence level which subjects 
indicated “yes”，subjects also estimated their confidence level rated 1 (totally diffident) 
to 10 (totally confident). A participant's self-efficacy score was computed by 
summing the confidence for each profit level answered “yes.” Such measure was the 
standard method for assessing self-efficacy in various studies (e.g., Bandura, 1984; 
Silver, Mitchell & Gist, 1995). 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS 
Manipulation Checks 
Reliability of Mood Measures 
As expected, factor analysis (extraction: principle component, varimax rotation) 
showed that the eight items loaded into two factors: mood pleasure and mood arousal. 
The reliability of the measures were high, Cronbach's a for mood pleasure and 
arousal were .94 and .90 respectively (see Table 7). 
TABLE 7 
FACTOR LOADING OF MOOD MEASURES  
Mood Pleasure Mood Arousal 
Bad — Good 翌 .23 
Unpleasant — Pleasant ^ .29 
Sad- Happy M .21 
Negative — Positive ^ .29 
Tired - Energetic .21 .87 
Dull - Alert .27 ^ 
Sleepy - Awake .23 .85 
Bored - interested ^ .84 
Note: Reliability ofMood pleasure (a =.94); Mood Arousal (a =.90) 
Measures in other rounds showed similar results. 
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The mean scores of factor items were calculated to perform correlation analysis 
with Affect Grid measure. Consistent with the results in the pretest, the two measures 
of Mood Pleasure showed better convergence (correlation r = .62, p < .001) than of 
Mood Arousal (correlation r = .35, p < .01). Again, Affect Grid provided simple and 
reliable measure on Mood Pleasure. Its repeated-measure scores were used for 
subsequent analysis. 
Effect of Manipulations 
The mood pleasure scores for the displeased, neutral, and pleased groups did not 
show difference before manipulation {M = 5.42, 5.96, 6.0, F(2,5S) 二 1.0, p > .1). 
However, after the manipulation (i.e., free trial task, and music), the pleased group {M 
=6.84) reported more positive affect than the neutral group (M = 6.41) and the 
displeased group (M= 5.26), F(2,58) = 6.41,p < .01. Dunnett test showed that the 
difference between displeased and neutral group was also significant at p = .05 level, 
suggesting that manipulations was successful. At a = .05, the observed power was .89, 
suggesting that the sample size was adequate. 
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However , the mood states of the three groups, in particular the pleased group, 
changed dramatical ly af ter trading started (see Figure 2). Though displeased subjec ts ' 
mood did not much throughout the trading periods ( j % = 5.26, M, = 5.68), neutral 
group became happier ( H , = 6.41, M, = 6.59); and pleased group had their moods 
worsened (M,, = 6.84, A/, = 5.79). 
M A N O V A o f t h e six repeated measures on Mood Pleasure showed lack o f m a i n 
ef tecl of manipulat ion, F(2,57) 二 1 . 4 9 , p > .1; period effect , F(2 ,285) = 1 . 2 5 , p > .1; 
and period x group interaction effect , F( lO,285) 二 1 . 4 4 , ^ > . l . A N O V A o f e a c h round 
showed that three groups did not differ in their mood, F(2,58) = .88, .61, .38，and 1.42, 
rcspcclivcly. p > .1. The observed power declined to only .29 after round 4. 
Thc cease of effccl o f m u s i c in maintaining subjects ' mood states suggested that 
when major gains and losses were involved, subjects paid more attention and weight 
on, and thus were more affected by, performance feedback than by music. The drastic 
worsening of mood of lhe pleased group supported thai positive affect led lo greater 
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negative utility ofloss (Isen，Nygren, & Ashby, 1988). 
Since results showed that perfonnance and affect was an interact.ve process, it 
was . ean ingM to study how affects influence the initial trad.ng p e r f o _ c e ’ and 
,nal perfonnance, i.e., the outcome of such interactive process. William Eckhardt's 
experience in N.w Market W.ar, (Schwager, 1992, p.l31) best illustrated this _ : 
“in many ways, large prof.s are even more insidious than large losses in tenns of 
emotional destabUization. I think it's important not to be emotionally attached to large 
_ t s . , , And “The people who survive avoid snowball scenarios in which bad trades 
cause them to become emotionally destabilized and make more bad trades. They are 
also able to feel the pain of losing." Could pleased subjects avoid the snow ball effect? 
^^^^^^_^^[^2i^^i:2L^iii^^ 
correlation analysis between profit in round one with all control variables, i.e., 
experience, self-eff.cacy, and gender was performed. Results were all i _ n i f i c a n t , r 
二 .09，.13, -.18, respectively, p > 丄 When using total profit, results were similar, r 
二 .19，.02, -.09, respectively, p > 丄 Therefore, the three control variables were not 
related to trading performance. Also, all the control variables had low correlation (.08 
to . 14, p > .1) with mood pleasantness and arousal. 
In addition, three groups were not significantly different in terms of gender, f (2) 
二 3.42,p> .1; self-efficacy, F (2, 57) = 1.45,p> .1; and experience, F (2, 58) = 22,p 
� . 1 . As 34 (55.7%) subjects reported no actual investment experience, experience 
scores were re-coded as 0 (no experience), and 1 (have experience) and analyzed 
aaain. This time, experience showed msigmficant correlation (r = .09, P > .D with & 
round one profit, but modestly correlated with total profit (r = .23, p 二 .07). Also, 
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displeased group had only 2 people (10.5%) with experience, while neutral group had 
12 (54.5%), and pleased group had 13 (65%), x' (2) = l3A9,p < .01. 
Interestingly, though displeased group was the most inexperienced, while pleased 
group was the most experienced, displeased group outperfom the pleased group! That 
was inconsistent with the positive correlation shown above. That suggested that 
individual difference had only trivial within-group effect, comparing with the 
between-group affect of mood on performance. All control variables were discarded 
from subsequent analysis. 
FIGURE 3 TRADING PERFORMANCE - MEAN CUMULATIVE PROFITS 
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As shown in Figure 3，neutral group achieved the highest average cumulative 
profits throughout the trading rounds, which was followed by the depressed group (M 
=124,379). After 4 rounds of trading, the average profit cumulated for neutral 
subjects was $196,691，outperformed the displeased subjects {M= $124,379) by 58o/o! 
It was even astonishing to see that pleased group suffered from trading losses in the 
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whole simulation and result in net losses (M= - 56,120)! 
That is consistent with William Eckhardt's comment that pleased subjects had 
their emotions destabilized, and caused a snowball effect in making bad trades. 
MANOVA found strong affect main effect, F(2,58) = 3.4，p < .05, and period effect, 
F(3, 174) = 2.6, p = .05, but no interaction effect, F(6, 174) = .29, p > .1. Mood 
therefore significantly accounted for the differences in trading performance. Existence 
of period effect indicated that trading performance varied in each round. Profit in each 
round was examined. 
TABLE 8 
TRADING PERFORMANCE - PROFIT IN EACH ROUND 
Round Displeased Group Neutral Group Pleased Group 
1 5,642 79,136 (-91,430) *** 
(143,958) (170,061) (175,232) 
2 28,084 22,618 11,210 
(175,326) (153,982) (160,353) 
3 16,610 53,563 30,980 
(186,538) (240,588) (208,799) 
4 74,042 41,372 (-6,880) 
(196,879) (204,175) (197,059) 
Total 124,379 196,691 (-56,120) ** 
(347,137) (466,506) (416,328) 
Note: Figures in- ( ) are standard deviations 
**: Statistically different from the neutral group a tp < .05. 
***: Statistically different from the neutral group a tp < .01 
As shown in Table 8, neutral group eamed the highest profit {M= 79,136) than 
the displeased group (M = 5,642), and the pleased group {M = -91,430). ANOVA 
showed significant affect main effect, F(2,58) = 5.67, p < .01, and orthogonal 
comparisons indicated that such difference were due to pleased-neutral group 
difference, /(58) 二 3.36, p < .001; displeased-neutral group difference were 
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insignificant, r(58) 二 1.43,;? = .16, ns. 
MANOVA showed that affect main effects were insignificant, F(2,58) = 2.02, p 
> .1, period effect was minimal, F(3,174) = .59, p >.1, and so was interaction effect, 
F(6 ,174)=l . l l , ;7>. l . 
Pleased group suffered from loss in round 1, and 4, in which there were market 
turning points, while displeased group eamed the largest profit in round 4. As 
literature showed that positive affect promoted automatic-like, habitual processing 
(Sinclair, 1988; Isen and Daubman, 1984), pleased subjects might failed to detect 
market reversal but increased their bet size and resulted in trading losses. As shown 
later, positive affect led to poorer judgment accuracy, their poor trading performance 
was expected. 
TABLE 9 
TRADING PERFORMANCE - MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Beta rvalue Sign. T 
Decision .65 9.41 .00 
Invest. Size’ -.55 -5.59 .00 
Decison x Inv.size' .78 7.93 .00 
Constant -6.65 .00 
Note: Adjusted R^ = .71, F(3,57) = 50.77,p< .001. 
Results in other rounds were similar, with R^ ranged from .84 to .91. 
On the other hand, neutral and displeased subjects seemed to perform better in 
detecting market changes. On the whole, the performance of the neutral subjects was 
more stable comparing to that of displeased subjects. Therefore, in terms of profit 
amount and stability, neutral group achieved better performance. Previous sections 
showed that displeased subjects' judgments were slightly better than of neutral 
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subjects. The resulted poorer performances seemed to support H19 that trading 
performance was an interaction between decision and investment strategy, in 
particular, investment size. 
Multiple regression analysis using first round data confirmed the existence of 
interaction. To control for multicollinearity of independent variables, the following 
data transformation was made: (a). Let profit’ = profit - mean (profit�., and (b) let 
investment size，= investment size - mean {investment size). As shown in Table 9, 
three variables entered, i.e., buy/sell decision, investment size，，and interaction, were 
all significant at p < .001. The R square of the model was .71, F(3,57) = 50.77, p 
< .001, suggesting that the model had strong explanation power on trading 
performance. 
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Investment Size (niUion) 
Examining Figure 4, we could find significant interaction effect: if a decision was 
correct, increasing investment size would enhance performance; if a decision was 
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false, increasing investment size would incur heavier loss. We can also fmd that both 
pleased and neutral subjects had large investment size. As pleased subjects made 
wrong judgment, they occupied the bottom right of the graph. Neutral subjects on the 
other hand occupied the upper right of the graph, indicating superior performance. 
And displeased subjects concentrated in the left due to small investment size, and 
achieve modest profits. 
To further analyze the interaction effect, value 0 and 1 were substituted into 
variable decision in the regression equation. When decision = 0，profit = fiQ + P2 
inv.size. As Table 9 shown, P2 was significant. When decision = 0, profit = {fiQ ^Pi ) 
+ {fi2 + P3) inv.size. rvalue for {fi2 + fi3) was 3.56,p < .01. 
That suggested that achieving superb trading performance required both accurate 
judgment as well as proper investment strategies. As Stanley Dmnckenmiler, the 
successor of Geroge Soros explained in New Market Wizard (Schwager, 1992, p.l97) 
"It's my philosophy, which has been reinforced by Mr. Soros, that when you eam the 
right to be aggressive, you should be aggressive." Therefore, H19 and H20a were 
supported, and H20b was rejected. 
Information Acquisition 
Negative Information 
As shown in Table 10, pleased subjects searched the largest number of news 
items {M= 1.63)，than neutral subjects {M= 1.09) and displeased subjects {M= 1.00). 
Orthogonal comparison indicated that the difference between pleased and neutral 
subject was marginally significant, r(58) = l.8O,;7 = .08. Such difference widened in 
6 0 
round 2, M= 2.20 vs. 1.45, r(58) = 2.31,p < .05, suggesting that pleased group tried 
to improve their decision making after losing heavily in round 1. 
TABLE 10 
INFORMATION ACQUISITION - NEGATIVE NEWS  
Displeased Group Neutral Group Pleased Group 
Round No. ofItems Time Spent No. ofItems Time Spent No. ofItems Time Spent 
1 1.00 91.74 1.09 104.77 1.63 * 65.63 * 
(1.00) (82.22) (.87) (76.91) (1.01) (62.63) 
2 1.47 68.16 1.45 91.18 2.20 ** 55.55 * 
(1.07) (67.24) (1.10) (63.43) (.95) (50.19) 
3 1.37 41.58 * 1.14 71.41 1.32 45.95 
(.60) (39.44) (.99) (63.99) (.93) (45.59) 
4 .95 47.94 .68 41.95 1.00 47.10 
(.91) (57.28) (.72) (39.73) (.92) (52.34) 
Total 4.79 249.42 4.36 309.32 6.10 ** 210.95 ** 
(2.51) (149.89) (2.30) (180.35) (2.75) (129.82) 
Note: Time spent was counted in seconds. 
Figures in ( ) are standard deviations. 
*: Statistically different from the neutral group at p < .1. 
**: Statistically different from the neutral group a tp < .05. 
However, when looking at the time spent, the picture was exactly the opposite. 
Pleased subjects spent the least time in reading and analyzing the news, M = 65.63 
seconds, significantly less than neutral subjects {M= 104.77，r(58) = 1.68,p < .1), and 
even the displeased group (M= 91.74). In addition, this tendency persisted in round 2, 
M = 55.55 vs. 91.18，r(58) = 1.9，p = .06，of the neutral group, and 68.16 of the 
displeased group. In total, pleased group browsed the largest number of news items in 
the trading simulation, M= 6.1, significantly higher than the neutral group, M= 4.36, 
r(58) = 2.23,p < .05. Again, time spent was 210.95 seconds, significantly less than the 
neutral group of 309.32 seconds, r(58) = 2.04, p <.05. That suggested that pleased 
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subjects refused or overlooked negative news and their implications. Therefore, 
Hypothesis la, instead of lb was supported. 
Displeased group read 4.79 news items, slightly more than the neutral group. In 
terms of time spent, their time was slightly less than the neutral group in the first 
round, M= 91.74; however, it dropped significantly in following rounds as they were 
making profit. As a whole, they spent 249.42 seconds, longer than the pleased group 
but shorter than the neutral group. 
The behavior of both displeased and pleased subjects was interesting. Pleased 
subjects paid less attention to negative information initially, and adjusted their 
behavior when facing negative consequence; while depressed subjects paid much 
attention to negative information initially, their attention dropped at a much faster 
pace than other two groups after making profit. That indicated that information 
selection was also a choice between the current and future emotional cost and benefits. 
(Hogarth, 1987). As the resulting cost and benefit from the investment decision is far 
more substantial, depressed subjects could overcome their emotions for future benefits. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2b, instead of 2a, was supported. 
Note that time spent of all three groups declined in each round. MANOVA found 
very strong period effect, F(3,171) = 7.35, p < .001, and no main effect, F(2,57)= 
1.79, p > .1，and no interaction effect, F(6,171) = 1.05, p > .1. That suggested that 
subjects formed their market views (hypothesis) in round one, and adjusted their view 
in subsequent rounds according to feedback Q3rof1t) and news (new cues). In this 
regard, their initial judgment in first round has significant impact on overall 
performance. 
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‘ Positive and Irrelevant Information 
Unlike the situation in negative news, displeased subjects spent approximately 
similar time (M= 75.47) as pleased subjects {M= 75.84). Their time were all less than 
of neutral group {M = 126.82). Orthogonal comparisons of displeased-neutral and 
pleased-neutral differences indicated that their differences with the neutral group {M = 
126.82) were significant,�58) = 2.34，2.32，respectively,;? < .05. 
TABLE 11 
INFORMATION ACQUISITION - POSITIVE NEWS  
Displeased Group Neutral Group Pleased Group 
Round No. ofItems Time Spent No. ofItems Time Spent No. ofItems Time Spent 
1 1.47 75.47 ** 1.14 126.82 1.74 * 75.84 ** 
(1.02) (65.54) (.94) (78.64) (.99) (63.88) 
2 1.53 89.68 1.27 89.18 1.65 95.50 
(1.07) (53.59) (.98) (65.85) (1.14) (69.64) 
3 1-26 74.89 1.59 82.27 1.35 66.10 
(.99) (79.18) (1.05) (64.32) (.87) (49.84) 
4 1.74 69.58 1.50 65.91 1.63 43.00 
(1.15) (55.96) (1.06) (52.05) (.99) (59.21) 
Total 6.00 309.63 5.50 364.18 6.30 276.65 
(3.40) (191.40) (2.72) (192.77) (2.74) (145.66) 
Note: Time spent was counted in seconds. 
Figures in ( ) are standard deviations. 
*: Statistically different from the neutral group at p <.1. 
**: Statistically different from the neutral group a t p < .05. 
Consistent with results in negative news, pleased subjects searched more news 
items {M= 1.74) than the neutral subjects {M= 1.14), ,(58) = 1.80, p < .1. Also, 
pleased group spent more than in round 2 than in round 1. For total time spent in 
positive news, neutral group took the longest time {M= 364.18), pleased group spent 
the least (M= 276.65), and depressed group ranked second (M= 309.63). However, 
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their difference was not significant, F(2,58) 二 1.30,p> .1 (Table 11). 
Moreover, although there was no main effect of affects found, F(2,57) = 1.04,;? 
> .1, period effect was strong, F(3,171) 二 5A2,p < .001, interaction effect was also 
significant，F(6,171) = 1.86,;? = .09. 
Results in irrelevant news showed similar pattem (Table 12). Pleased subjects 
read 1.47 news items, doubled the .74 amount of neutral subjects. Their difference 
was significant,广(58) 二 2.69,p 二 .01. However，both pleased and displeased subjects 
took similar time, M= 36.63 vs. 32.74, significantly less than the neutral subjects, M 
=68.55, r(58) 二 2.10, 2.76, respectively, p < .05. In the whole trading simulation, 
neutral subjects used on average 110.51 seconds in irrelevant news, more than pleased 
subjects {M= 98.40), and displeased subjects {M=1221). Same as the situation in the 
positive news, their differences were insignificant, F(2,58) = 1.10,j!7 > .1. 
The fact that pleased subjects took less time to searching positive and irrelevant 
news was expected because it was consistent with theory that positive affect promoted 
efficient information processing. Hypothesis 3 was supported. However, displeased 
subjects spent less time than the neutral subjects, and even showed little difference 
with the pleased subjects. That was not consistent with mainstream research findings 




INFORMATION ACQUISITION - IRRELEVANT NEWS  
Displeased Group Neutral Group Pleased Group 
Round No. ofItems Time Spent No. ofItems Time Spent No. ofItems Time Spent 
1 1.11 32.74 ** .73 68.55 1.47 " 36.63 " 
(.99) (26.86) (.77) (53.49) (.90) (43.54) 
2 .84 * 30.95 .41 34.23 1.45 *** 48.50 
(.83) (36.80) (.59) (40.91) (.89) (46.39) 
3 .21 2.37 .14 .55 .25 6 . 9 5 " 
(.54) (7.64) (.47) (2.56) (.55) (12.76) 
4 .42 6.21 .27 7.18 .20 8.15 
(.51) (14.68) (.55) (12.35) (.52) (17.18) 
Total 2.58 * 72.27 1.55 110.51 3.30 ** 98.40 
(2.04) (56.63) (1.90) (89.69) (2.03) (96.90) 
Note: Time spent was counted in seconds. 
Figures in ( ) are standard deviations. 
*: Statistically different from the neutral group at p < . 1. 
**: Statistically different from the neutral group a tp < .05. 
***: Statistically different from the neutral group a tp < .01. 
Time Allocation 
To see the efficiencies in information searching, we can look at total time spent 
in news. Again, mean for displeased, neutral and pleased group was 199.95, 300.14, 
178.11 seconds respectively. ANOVA showed that affects' main effect was 
significant, F(2,57) = 4.50,;? < .05. Displeased subjects only took slightly more time 
than pleased subjects, and their time were both significantly less than the neutral 
subjects from Dunnett test atp < .05. 
In terms of time allocation, displeased subjects spent about 45.88% of time in 
negative news, and 37.71% in positive news, very different from pleased and neutral 
subjects, who both spend about 42% time in positive news, and 35% to 37% of time 
6 5 
in negative news. In addition, Displeased subjects spent only 16.37% of time in 
irrelevant news, less than neutral subjects (22.84%), and pleased subjects (20.57%) 
(Figure 5). Biased attention to negative news of displeased subjects supported 
argument that as task importance i.e., the cost and benefits of decision outcome 
increases, displeased subjects may increase their current costs in both mental effort 
and emotional burden for future benefits. Hypothesis 5b and 6b were therefore 
supported. 
FIGURE 5 TIME ALLOCATION IN POSITIVE, NEGATIVE & IRRELEVANT NEWS 
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Though neutral subjects allocated time indifferent from pleased subjects in 
percentage term, absolute amount were much higher. That indicated that neutral 
subjects used the compensatory strategies that searched different types of news, and 
made more effort in weighing different information cues. On the other hand, pleased 
and displeased subjects used non-compensatory strategies that acquired information 
more selectively, and paid less effort in evaluating implications of different news. 
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Summary 
In summary, results showed that positive affect reduced effort in information 
acquisition via selective information searching whereas negative affect led to 
significant bias towards negative information. On the other hand, emotional neutrality 
promoted the use of more balanced information searching. 
Evaluation and Judgment 
As previous section showed that affects led to selective information acquisition, 
would that cause poorer decision quality as Hypothesis 8a, 9b, 11, and 12b predicted? 
Decision Time 
Decision time was measured by the time taken in the "Placing Order" web page. 
However, information acquisition and processing may be an interactive process. In 
other words, people may read a news item and form a tentative view (hypothesis), and 
adjust their views as reading more news until the final decision is made. Therefore, 
two other measures, 1) time spent in news reading plus time spent in making buy / sell 
decision; and 2) total time spent to finish a round, were also used to perform analysis. 
Results were similar, and even showed greater significance, especially for measure 1. 
As previous section suggested that both positive and negative affect promoted 
the use of selective information acquisition, and conflict-avoiding strategies, mental 
efforts could therefore be reduced. Consistent with this argument, displeased group 
spent less time {M= 108.52) than the neutral group {M= 179.59), r(58) = 2.%l,p < .01; 
same as pleased group, M= 122.45, r(58) = 2.28,p< .05 (Table 13). 
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MANOVA showed significant affect main effect, F(2,58) = 2.85,p=.07; period 
effect, F(3,174) = 12.46，p < .001; and interaction effect, F(6,174) 二 2.56, p <.05. 
Significance in period and interaction effect suggested that mental effort in decision 
declined as subjects were adjusting their views with new information, and the speeds 
of decline differed in three affect groups due to different performance achieved. 
Moreover, the difference in total time between displeased and neutral subjects was 
also significant, M= 364.32 vs. 494.18, r(58) 二 233,p< .05; but difference between 
pleased and displeased group was not significant, /(58) == 1.54,p > .1. That indicated 
that pleased group deviated from their initial strategy, while depressed group stuck to 
their existing strategy, according to performance. 
TABLE 13 
EVALUATION & JUDGEMENT - DECISION TIME 
Round Displeased Group Neutral Group Pleased Group 
1 108.52 *** 179.59 122.45** 
(43.43) (106.49) (47.65) 
2 83.37 ** 115.73 106.40 
(33.58) (56.63) (54.66) 
3 97.47 97.82 96.20 
(65.12) (52.86) (60.51) 
4 78.95 101.05 86.85 
(40.05) (53.24) (54.89) 
Total 364.32 ** 494.18 411.90 
(125.35) (223.32) (144.15) 
Note: Time spent was counted in seconds. 
Figures in ( ) are standard deviations. 
*: Statistically different from the neutral group a t p < .1. 
**: Statistically different from the neutral group a tp < .05. 
***: Statistically different from the neutral group a tp < .01 
Result about pleased subjects again was consistent with existing literature, while 
result for displeased subjects was inconsistent. H7 and HlOb were supported and 
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HlOa was rejected. That once again supported the explanation of conflict model of 
choice, and use of conflict -confronting or -avoiding strategies in choice behavior. 
Decision Complexity 
Complexity measured the degree subjects integrated different (i.e., positive vs. 
negative) information cues and made inference and prediction accordingly. Subjects' 
reasons for decision were coded according to the coding scheme that divided the 
construct into 6 levels (Appendix 3). It ranged from 1 (primitive or intuitive reasoning, 
e.g., "General news were bad for Germany," to 6 (complex decision-making, 
integrating both negative and positive information and making prediction, e.g., 
"Although the marks has some good news to support, e.g., Russian election, but the 
EU is important than these news. Furthermore, as the curve rises very sharply, this 
may be the time to take profit for investors. Then sell Marks." 
TABLE 14 
EVALUATION & JUDGEMENT - DECISION COMPLEXITY 
Round Displeased Neutral Pleased 
1 1.74 *** 3.05 2.75 
(.93) (1.81) (1.59) 
2 2.16* 3.14 2.70 
(1.30) (1.81) (1.84) 
3 1.90 ** 3.23 2.65 
(1.20) (1.66) (1.84) 
4 1.63 ** 2.64 2.35 
^ (1.47) (1.50)  
Note: Figures in ( ) are standard deviations 
*: Statistically different from the neutral group at p < . 1. 
**: Statistically different from the neutral group a tp < .05. 
***: Statistically different from the neutral group a tp < .01 
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We can see that levels of decision complexity indicate relative cognitive demand 
in making the inference. As Hogarth (1987) suggested, intuitive reasoning is the most 
primitive form of reasoning, which cannot cope well with complex tasks. When a task 
becomes complicated, a decision-maker has to use different strategies (conflict-
avoiding to -confronting strategies) to process larger amount of information. The 
highest level of complexity indicates the use of non-compensatory strategies, which 
consumes the largest portion of cognitive capacity in order to process the largest 
amount of information. 
The decision complexity was also measured by an objective measure, i.e., the 
number of words in the reasons for decision. The two measures produced consistent 
results. As expected, neutral group had the most comprehensive reasoning process {M 
二 3.05). Interestingly, although both displeased and pleased group took similar time in 
reaching decision, reasoning process of the displeased group were significantly less 
comprehensive than that of the neutral group, M = 1.74, r(58) 二 2.96, p < .01. The 
mean score of pleased group was 2.75, slightly less than the neutral group, /(58) = .56, 
p > .1. LSD test found that the difference between the displeased and pleased group 
was significant atp < 0.5. Moreover, while the displeased-neutral difference persisted, 
the displeased-pleased group differences diminished after round 1 (Table 14). 
Results of the depressed group were consistent with the argument that both 
positive and negative affect promoted highly selective information searching and 
conflicting-avoiding strategies - though displeased subjects paid extra attention to 
negative news, they seemed to eliminate those factors in the decision making process. 
Interestingly, pleased group did not sacrifice much complexity for faster decision. 
That seemed to suggested that positive affect enhanced decision efficiency, as 
7 0 
founded by existing literature. However, before reaching such conclusion, we had to 
examine whether such group differences resulted in better accuracy in decision. 
Decision Accuracy 
As Table 15 showed, unexpectedly and yet interestingly, thirteen (68.42%) 
displeased subjects made correct decision (i.e., to buy), despite of their simple 
reasoning process. Their accuracy was similar to the neutral group, of which 14 
(63.64%) made correct decision. Both groups performed better than the pleased group, 
of which only 6 (30%) subjects chose correctly. Non-parametric chi-square test 
showed that such differences in accuracy were significant, %^{2) = 7.05, p < .05, G 
= .34. 
TABLE 15 
EVALUATION & JUDGEMENT - DECISION ACCURACY  
Round No. of Displeased Group Neutral Group Pleased Group 
1 Win 13 (68.42%) 14(63.64%) 6 (30.00%) 
Loss 6 (31.58%) 8 (36.36%) 14 (70.00%) 
2 Win 11 (57.89%) 11 (50.00%) 9 (45.00%) 
Loss 8 (42.11%) 11 (50.00%) 11 (55.00%) 
3 Win 11 (57.89%) 11 (50.00%) 11 (55.00%) 
Loss 8 (42.11%) 11 (50.00%) 9 (45.00%) 
4 Win 13 (68.42%) 13 (59.09%) 9 (45.00%) 
^ 6 (31.58%) 9 (40.91%) 11 (55.0Q%) 
Average No. ofWins 2.53 ^ \_J^  
In addition, in 4 rounds of trading simulation, displeased group made on average 
2.53 correct decisions, slightly better than the neutral group {M 二 2.23), and much 
better than the pleased group {M= 1.75). ANOVA found affect main effect, F(2,58)= 
2.63, p = .08. LSD test found that the displeased-pleased group difference was 
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significant at p < .05, That was particularly surprising as pleased group was found to 
be similar to the neutral group and better than the displeased group regarding decision 
complexity. 
Such results suggested that even though negative affect promoted selective 
information searching and conflict-avoiding strategies, displeased subjects were able 
to identify important information cues and thus enhanced decision accuracy. Results 
in this section were consistent with existing findings that negative affects led to highly 
differentiated information categorization and the greatest accuracy in decision; and on 
the contrary, positive affect induced broader categorization of information, and less 
accuracy in decision (e.g. Sinclair, 1988). Though previous section showed that 
displeased subjects paid particular attention to negative information, their stated 
reasons for decision did not included negative information�The resulted low decision 
complexity suggested that displeased subjects were more careful in screening and 
eliminating negative information. Accordingly, negative affect, instead of positive 
affect, led to better decision accuracy and efficiency! So, H8b, H9b, HlOb, H11, and 
H12a were supported, while H8a, H9a, HlOa, and H12a were rejected. 
Summary 
In summary, results showed that negative affect promoted careful screening and 
eliminating negative information, and resulted in faster decision time, less complexity, 
yet greater accuracy in decision. Positive affect, though speeded up the process of 
acquiring diverse information, and led to comprehensive decision making, it seemed 
to impede the ability of screening and evaluating of information, and resulted in less 
accuracy in decision making. 
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Would better decision accuracy lead to better trading performance? As 
performance should be an interaction between accuracy and strategy, such as 
investment size, we should examine the results in the strategy formulation first. 
TABLE 16 
STRATEGY FORMULATION - USE OF CUT-LOSS ORDER  
Round Cut-loss Displeased Neutral Pleased 
1 Yes 9 (47.37%) 17 (77.27%) 13(65.00%) 
No 10 (52.63%) 5 (22.73%) 7 (35.00%) 
2 Yes 10 (52.63%) 14 (63.64%) 16 (80.00%) 
No 9 (47.37%) 8 (36.36%) 4 (20.00%) 
3 Yes 11 (57.89%) 15 (68.18%) 16 (80.00%) 
No 8 (42.11%) 7 (31.82%) 4 (20.00%) 
4 Yes 11 (57.89%) 13 (59.09%) 16 (80.00%) 
1 ^ 8 (42.11%) 9 (40.91%) 4 (20.00%) 
Average No. oforders 2.16 2.68 2.95 
Strategy Formulation 
Use of Cut-loss Order 
C o m r a r y to expec ta t ion , only 9 (47 .37%) d isp leased subjec t s used cul- loss order 
in round one, less than the number of 17 (77 .27%) neutral subjects，and 13 (65 .0%) 
pleased subjec ts (Table 16). 
T h o u g h d i f fc rences a m o n g the three g roups were margina l ly ins ignif icant , y / (2 ) 
二 -V)0, p = .14, ns., d ispleased group did use fewer cut- loss order than the neutral 
g roup - Mann-W'hi iney U - W'ilcoxon Rank Sum W' test showed that ii = 146.5, u . = 
336.5, p =.05. In lhc whole trading s imula t ion , d ispleased group placcd also fewer cul-
loss orders (A/ = 2.16) ihan ihc neutral g roup {M = 2.6S). and ihc pleased g roup (A/ = 
2.95). Howevcr . the ditTcrcnces were insignif icant . F (2 ,58) 二 1.06, p > .1. ns. Such 




STRATEGY FORMULATION - USE OF LIMIT-PROFIT ORDER  
Round Cut-loss Displeased Group Neutral Group Pleased Group 
1 Yes 9 (47.37%) 11 (50.00%) 13 (65.00%) 
No 10 (52.63%) 11 (50.00%) 7 (35.00%) 
2 Yes 10 (52.63%) 11 (50.00%) 14 (70.00%) 
No 9 (47.37%) 11 (50.00%) 6 (30.00%) 
3 Yes 11 (57.89%) 10 (45.45%) 15 (75.00%) 
No 8 (42.11%) 12 (54.55%) 5 (25.00%) 
4 Yes 9 (47.37%) 11 (50.00%) 14 (70.00%) 
^ 10 (52.63%) 11 (50.00%) 6 (30.Q0%) 
Average No. of orders 2.00 1.95 2.80 
Use ofLimit-profit Order 
There were 13 (65%) pleased subjects used limit-profit order, slightly more than 
the number of the neutral group of 11 (50%) subjects, and of the displeased group of 9 
(47.37%) subjects (Table 17). Nonetheless, their differences were insignificant, x^(2) 
=1.45, p > .1. Figures on the whole trading simulation were similar: pleased group 
placed more limit-profit orders {M 二 2.80) than both the neutral {M = 2.0) and 
displeased group (M= 1.95); but their differences were again insignificant, F(2,58)= 
l.25,p>.L 
Investment Size 
As shown in Table 18, though displeased subjects used less cut-loss orders, 
which was counter intuitive, they demonstrated their cautiousness by significantly 
reducing their investment size (M= 242,105), only about half of the neutral group (M 
=454,545), or of the pleased group (M = 425,000). MANOVA found affect main 
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effect, F(2,58) = 2.8,p = .07, and period effect, F(3,174) = 11.18,;? < .001, but no 
affect X period interaction effect, F(6,174) = 1.13, p > .1. The affect main effect was 
due to the displeased-neutral difference, especially in round 1. Orthogonal 
comparisons found significant displeased-neutral group difference, t(5S) = 3.29, p 
< .01, but no neutral-pleased group difference, r(58) = .38, p > .1. LSD test showed 
that displeased-pleased difference was also significant atp < .05. 
TABLE 18 
STRATEGY FORMULATION - INVESTMENT SIZE 
Round Displeased Neutral Pleased 
1 242,105 *** 454,545 425,000 
(130,451) (268,554) (307,580) 
2 300,000 * 418,182 410,000 
(205,480) (170,814) (202,355) 
3 389,474 509,091 495,000 
(215,753) (270,641) (272,368) 
4 452,632 500,000 575,000 
(238,905) (239,046) (257,263) 
Total 1,384,210 ** 1,881,818 1,9Q5,0Q0 
Note: Figures in ( ) are standard deviations. 
*: Statistically different from the neutral group at p < . 1. 
**： Statistically different from the neutral group a tp < .05. 
***： Statistically different from the neutral group a tp < .01 
Such differences disappeared as displeased subjects increased their investment 
sizes when their profits were at the positive territories. In particular, displeased group 
invested on average $452,632 in the final round, almost doubled the size in round 1. 
That indicated that displeased subjects were willing to take more risk in order to 
achieve better performance. However, figures of total investment amounts in the 
whole trading showed that displeased subjects invested about $500,000 less than 
neutral subjects and the pleased subjects. Orthogonal comparisons showed significant 
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displeased-neutral difference, /(58) = 2.04, p < .05. Displeased-pleased group 
difference was significant at p < .05 in LSD test. 
Summary 
In summary, results found no neutral-pleased differences in using cut-loss or 
limit-profit orders, as well as investment size. Displeased subjects significantly 
reduced investment size and use of cut-loss orders than other groups, but use of limit-
profit orders. 
Discussion 
Given reduced investment size was indicative of cautious attitude of displeased 
subjects, why didn7 they use relatively more cut-loss orders as supposed by H16, and 
more limit-profit as supposed by H17? 
The first explanation is that displeased subjects had limited their losses by 
significantly reducing their investment size. Placing cut-loss order became less 
important since the loss amount will be limited. Why don't they use cut-loss order to 
further reduce their losses? 
The second explanation is that cut-loss may stimulate displeased subjects to think 
about losses. The induced negative feeling may put an end to the cut-loss decision. 
The third explanation is the disadvantages of cut-loss order. To elaborate, 
although placing cut-loss order can protect the downside risk of an investor, how to 
set the cut-loss point is a complex task requiring enormous skills. If setting cut-loss 
point too wide, the loss amount will also be large when market goes against a position; 
if setting cut-loss point too tight instead, the position could be easily wiped out by 
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short-term market volatility. In such a case, the investor will lose even if he or she 
forecast correctly the ultimate direction of the market. The resulted psychological 
regret in such scenario was not easy to stand for amateur investors (e.g., Schwager, 
1989, 1992). Moreover, it could be very stressful when wondering what should be the 
optimal cut-loss point. In other words, the cognitive and emotional costs for the cut-
loss are high. 
Supposed there are two scenarios of losing money. In scenario one, the investor 
lost $200,000 due to wrong decision. In scenario two, the investor lost $100,000 
because he set his cut-loss point too tight. In fact, his market view was proved to be 
correct, and he should eam say, $400,000，ifhe fully invested. We can easily imagine 
that the later scenario is much irritating because a "malfunctioning" cut-loss order 
ruined a correct decision which potentially worth $400,000 profit, and resulted in net 
loss! The responsibility of such decision is difficult to relieve. Similarly, when 
investment tumed into profit, displeased subjects' mood had been improved, it 
became less justifiable to increase their mental cost (efforts), for minimal marginal 
benefits. 
Also, losing because of wrong judgment seems quite natural and well expected, 
and thus much less irritating (Hogarth, 1987). In this regard, people will put more 
weight than potential emotional costs than absolute profit or loss amount resulted. To 
limit the loss in monetary term, the only way is to invest less and “play safe". That is 
consistent with Bell's (1984, 1985) theory that factors such as regret and 
disappointment both affect people's decision — the attempt to minimize regret leads to 
"safe" decision. 
In light ofsuch calculation ofemotional costs, we could find displeased subjects' 
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behavior quite natural, because they put excessive attention to risks at the expense of 
benefits (Mann, 1992). Therefore, H16, H17 was rejected, while H18 was supported. 
When looking at pleased subjects, we could find that they were similar with 
neutral subjects. Note that their investment size increased in round 4. That suggested 
that when they were "new" to the market, i.e., odds of winning were unknown, 
pleased subjects did not adopt a risk-taking approach - only in the final round, they 
took risk in order to recoup early losses. H15 was rejected. 
Indifference in investment size indicated that pleased subjects were not risk-
adverse as depressed subjects. As cut-loss and limit-profit orders are common 
investment instruments, both pleased and neutral subjects use them for protection. 
H13 and 14 were rejected. 
To summarize, although negative affect led to accurate judgment, it also lead to 
sub-optimal investment strategies, which were evident from over-cautiousness in 
investment size, and failure to utilize cut-loss orders to protect downside risk. Positive 
affect caused inaccurate judgment, but there was no evidence of over-optimism in 




In this chapter, I will first discuss major findings of the study, and then the 
limitations and contribution of this study. Finally, managerial implications for both 
individual and institutional investors will be addressed. 
Discussion 
This study showed that trading performance was explained by interaction 
between investors' decisions and investment strategies, in particular, investment size. 
Contrary to most research findings, positive affect resulted in poor trading 
performance as it led to selective information acquisition, reduced effort in 
information differentiation and evaluation, and thus inaccuratejudgment. 
On the other hand, negative affect also impaired trading per formance . Even 
though negative affect led to selective informat ion searching, increased effor t in 
information differentiat ion and evaluation led to high accuracy in judgment . 
Unfor tunate ly , negative affect also led to over-caut iousness in investment size and 
failure in using protective strategies, e.g., cut-loss order, to limit downside risk. As a 
result, sub-optimal investment strategies hindered the achievement of stable and better 
investment performance. 
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Interestingly, emotional neutrality helped achieving sound judgment by 
facilitating balanced information searching, use of non-compensatory information 
processing strategies which produced better and consistent judgment, At the same 
time, emotional neutrality resulted in sound trading strategies, and resulted in stable 
and superior trading performance. 
From the psychic cost/benefit perspective, it can be explained that affect 
influences the emotional cost/benefit of engaging in the decision-making task, and the 
perceived emotional payoff resulted in the decision. 
To illustrate, displeased people paid extra effort to avoid badjudgment, and were 
extremely cautious in their strategy, so that their mood would not be worsened by the 
decision outcomes. On the other hand, pleased subjects already enjoy the positive 
mood states. If they increased mental efforts in processing information, heavy 
consumption of information-processing capacity would arouse stress, and ruin their 
current mood states. As a result, emotional distractions lead to unstable preference in 
choosing information and investment strategies, and result in bias in the decision-
making process. 
The results suggest that investors do not digest information automatically and 
instantaneously. Instead, even small changes in their moods can result in highly 
selective attention to information and biased interpretation of information. Different 
people have different speeds of learning on information arrived. Market atmosphere 
may easily induce selective attention to certain news, and negligence of other 
important news. 
In fact, that is consistent with successful investors ' observation that market of ten 
reacts to certain news yet does not respond to others. For example, in a bull market , 
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bear factors are ignored, and vice versa (Lefevre, 1976). 
Moreover, the superior performance achieved by emotional neutrality is 
consistent with most of investment wisdom available (e.g., Schwager, 1989, 1992). 
For example, the legendary investor Jesse Livermore taught us to be "speculating 
intelligently, in accordance with opinions or beliefs logically arrived at after a 
dispassionate study of underlying conditions “ (Lefevre, 1976). William 0'Neil 
(1995) also shared with us that "the whole idea is to be completely objective and 
recognize what the marketplace is telling you, rather than try to prove that the thing 
you said or did yesterday or six weeks ago was right." 
Results showed that pleased subjects were emotionally destabilized, and resulted 
in snowball effect of making more bad trades. That suggested that maintaining 
emotional neutrality is vital for investment success for both individual and 
institutional investors. And that is consistent with successful traders' advice of 
emotional discipline (Schwager, 1989, 1992). 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies 
The first limitation related to the homogeneity of the group. Although pretest 
showed that music could maintain the group homogeneity during the trading, it was 
not the case during the main experiment. That suggested that when major monetary 
,consequence was linked to the decision, subjects' mood would be heavily affected by 
their performance. 
In fact, that represented a great challenge for studying the interplay of affect and 
cognition in the context of investment, or risk-taking. To realistically simulate real-
world investment decision, monetary feedback is inevitable. Even though subjects' 
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mood can be manipulated successfully as in this experiment, it will change after the 
first decision is made. 
A legitimate question then is "Are the results in round one just by chance?" Two 
facts suggesting that the effects of mood should not be a random effect. First, the three 
experimental groups showed significant differences in the whole decision-making 
process and finally performance. Second, difference in performance persisted even 
after round four. The chance for these two facts randomly happen should be minimal. 
As this study showed that previous performance can be huge impact on the 
quality of the subsequent decision, it becomes an interesting and important issue for 
future study on such performance — mood interplay. 
The second limitation related to the use of student subjects. The use of student 
sample has been widely criticized for its poor external validity. Due to budget and 
time constraints, use of student sample was the only option for this study. 
Nevertheless, there were half of the subjects had actual investment experience. 
Analysis suggested that experience did not affect trading performance in this study. 
The reason for that may be because subjects' limited experience (M = 5.3 months) 
is not wide enough to create sufficient variance in performance. As successful traders 
emphasized "learning from mistakes", experienced investors may know more about 
managing their emotions. Though our experiment results are consistent with 
successful investors' experiences and the subjects' behavior is consistent with that of 
the amateur investors, cautions have to be made in generalizing the experiment results 
to explain experienced investors. A question worth further investigation is that "Will 
there be a positive relation between experience and performance?" 
The third limitation related to the stability of the results. As the study showed 
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that profit or loss affected subjects' mood, and we can see from Figure 2 that the 
mood pleasantness of the neutral group was increasing consistently. After round 4, the 
mean score was 6.59，very close to the score of 6.84 of the pleased group before round 
1. As successful traders suggested that large loss often followed a series of gains, a 
question worth future study is "Will neutral subjects change to behave as pleased 
subjects after reaching certain level of mood pleasantness?" In other words, will a 
certain range of mood pleasantness is good for decision-making? 
As this study showed the astonishing power of affect, i.e. the mild change in our 
mood, significance of studying the above three questions is warranted. 
Suggestions to Investors 
Individual Investors 
For individual investors, it is advised to be aware of their emotions and maintain 
emotional neutrality before making investment decisions. As this experiment showed, 
a good start can significantly affect the performance in the subsequent investment 
decisions. Ensuring emotional neutrality before starting to invest is therefore critical 
as some experienced investors emphasize achieving a "OK" state before investing. As 
Michael Marcus, a star trader pointed out in Market Wizard (Schwager, 1989: p45), 
“ Losing begets losing. When you start losing, it touches off negative elements in your 
psychology, it leads to pessimism." 
To achieve emotional neutrality, William Eckhardt in New Market Wizard 
(Schwager, 1992) suggested that: "In many ways, large profits are even more 
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insidious than large losses in terms of emotional destabilization. I think it's important 
not to be emotionally attached to large profits." And "If you're worried, channel that 
energy into research." He also wamed, “If you're playing for emotional satisfaction, 
you're bound to lose." 
His experience suggested that in order to achieve emotional neutrality, investors 
should hold a detached view on the value of profits, and concentrate solely on 
decision quality. As another trader put it (Schwager, 1989), “If you have done your 
part, the gain will take care of itself." 
Clearly, emotional discipline cannot be obtained without changing the value of 
money conceptually, and also deliberate efforts. Literature shows that affect can be 
influenced by the environment setting, such as lighting, temperature, and smell (Baron, 
1993). Designing an environment that cultivates a peaceful and tranquil atmosphere, 
should be helpful. 
In addition, careful analysis of market conditions and formulation of investment 
planning are thus effective way to minimize possible bias that emotions introduced in 
the decision making process. For example, in The Education of a Speculator, Victor 
Niederhoffer (1997) described how he leamed to control his emotion from sports and 
from the legendary burglar Willie Sutton, whose favorite saying was, "We had a 
plan." 
As investors' mood fluctuates when investments tum out to be profit or loss, 
maintaining an unaffected mind is difficult yet an important factor for sustained 
trading performance. In fact, heavy losses often occur after a series of winning, even 
for star traders. If an investor cannot control his / her emotion and achieve emotional 
balance, an effective strategy is to stop real trading after a series of euphoric winnings. 
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Also, an investor should reduce significantly his or her investment sizes, or stop real 
trading after suffering from losses (Schwager, 1987，1992). 
Since negative effect resulted in efficient yet accurate judgment, could it be 
beneficial to investments? Whether it enhances or impedes trading performance may 
depend on the risk-taking propensity of an investor. George Soros, for example, 
named himself as "insecurity analyst,’，indicating his preference to use negative affect 
to stimulate more careful study of market conditions. 
Institutional Investors 
For institutional investors, findings of this study have even more profound 
implications - ensuring emotional balance can significantly improve performance of 
their trading team in terms of profit amount and stability ofbetter risk-adjusted retum. 
Individual investors will still suffer from trading losses from misjudgments even when 
they have achieved emotional balance. On a group basis, such errors will be averaged 
out and result in stable retum. Therefore, institutional investors are advised to setup an 
Emotional Management System (EMS). 
The EMS should be part of the risk management system, and pay more attention 
to the emotional states of their investment professionals. Such efforts could improve 
substantially the quality of risk management — avoiding unsound investment decision 
is the best way to avoid downside risk. Specifically, the EMS should perform the 
following tasks. 
First, to provide tests in the recruiting process and select emotionally balanced 
investment professionals. Second, provide adequate training on emotion management 
skills, in addition to technical skills. Third, to monitor the emotions of investment 
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professionals by front-line managers and self reporting. Psychological counseling then 
can be provided to calm down emotionally destabilized people before they are 
allowed to trade again. Forth, to stop those who suffers from a series of losses to avoid 
irrational trading decisions. 
As this study suggests, training and counseling in emotion management should 
also be an integral yet neglected part in human resources management and support of 
investment professionals. In fact, psychological training has been widely utilized as an 
effective tool in sports to improve performance of sports players. The setup of EMS 
will prove to be highly cost-effective investment. 
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APPENDIX 1 
NEWS SELECTION PHASE ONE: JUDGES, RATING 
News Judge1 Judge 2 Judge 3 Mean Item Rewritten 
(Judge 2 & 3) (marked with 'x') 
RTl T 5 5 5 
R12 2 2 2 2 
R13 3 5 5 5 
R14 2 3 3 3 
R15 3 2 2 2 
R16 4 '3 3 3 X 
R17 4 3 3 3 
R18 4 3 3 3 X 
R19 4 3 3 3 
R21 4 3 3 3 
R22 5 5 2 3.5 x 
R23 5 2 1 1.5 
R24 4 3 3 3 
R25 2 4 4 4 
R26 1 3 2 2.5 x 
R27 2 4 4 4 
R28 2 4 3 3.5 x 
R29 3 1 1 1 
R31 2 1 1 1 
R32 2 4 5 4.5 
R33 4 3 3 3 
R34 2 3 3 3 
R35 4 3 3 3 x 
R36 5 5 5 5 
R37 3 2 2 2 
R38 1 3 3 3 
R39 1 2 2 2 
R41 2 4 2 3 X 
R42 4 4 4 4 
R43 3 5 4 4.5 
R44 3 3 3 3 
R45 4 2 1 1.5 
R46 5 3 3 3 
R47 5 2 1 1.5 
R48 4 3 3 3 
R49 1 1 1 1  
Note: 1 = DEM/CHF bullish, 3 = neutral / irrelevant, 5 = DEM/CHF bearish 
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APPENDIX 2 
SCREEN LAYOUTS OF THE INTERNET TRADING SYSTEM 
News & Charts Screen 
• — M . _ , U , _ k » i » ^ A C T 7 M _ ^ l ^ _ ' 0 ^ _ _ _ _ _ :， 1 
[ilc Cdit Vicv/ go Qookmarka Qptiona Btrcctofy~^ fmdow~~fcjdp 
•：•••<； ； ； ；••；；；{•： ； ： :、;:;{•: ； ！ ；-M'M ；: :,:;:;i.:: : :i;iM i ： ^ ;:I:i-'; ： !•:：； {•! I •: ! ;:i'M i :.:-;.:•!.: ： :.5,::K ； : :、!;:，{•: : :-i::.i.: i : l'M-M i l '. 'f'. ‘ 1 : IM :-i.:.K ； i:;.i.J i i^v<'i ];i;|;r • Ww3^B,wiD $tottr%dins i^ w^nsncyp^irDE^iyOIF Sir4 jnnu^-T<nu:iAUblr3pial b DEM1 jnOUoiL The "““ jgyty^t^jgte2D;i^JB$»»trtfaAjcl^yatmA:¥»tHAyft frBfe1tt tott^;itfra;httrt Myfe/iShrtg^,;y»y:jypfigj^ <ft^jgtoi^-ayvayty;frM»:工 
1>MmfiW 切 DM l^ 00^ 0a, ewh hHmm^vnnU JDMlDO^M, Y F^iiSp to jmdgcw5*5i^ ik^ w^Lss"^  二 gfl:^ :ordjmniH)th»e.ndi^ <»uiotkrMcmanikbtf6d:o»[;dt»:tMi<£ajtd!charis,rrridcd“r^_toiOiatyoiikavft na ；•： ：• ~r-
iJiiiw]iii ;^:l4^ ;^Ji^ Lrf:ULiJ.:^ii; -^；：巧(:;:；；；：！弱丄^ 丨:]:i:iii:;.:: ;:i:;H:;.::: ;:;:ii{:;.: ； 5：^ ：^^：；--::；：巧？丄：；;:;:;it:；:；：;:;…;.:；：；女；:—;-::^^^^^  ； • ;:•，:;.: ： ::¾&;-::；：力专：;：‘ -:v：''讀 
• &?^ b^^ t?Jlu.Sj:t!^ &^L^ auute JL Strviis;jh of Swiss Fr<w. «—“^  灿 ^  
«»~ 冰 — — — p#^^>*^j<  
• §5^>摄组莊[£楚贩1?丄喊里?1細 j � 
Em?r.k.E*^ k^  谏 ^ ..…"-.j_\ 又 ，、 
• Dolliui^ but G<A=Mv Cni^td :\s \\,^j\i \^ 義丨、fv% fA 
• Swks N'^dxtnul B'±ak Pxvs Sats 》‘ ‘ \ ,^/' i \ h >A , , 
,、, IV , r� �,"'”•<•.." 站容" �.�••{:)$ .Jf».*}-v^-"^r^-^;V r 
CkAnce Swi&s l*ra3u; W:Qllail 丨 .：jy y^  �‘ \ 
•妄胁1!^ &^^5.51?:鄉..脑怒血 cuc. …”iv 怜 i feMli&J!5M5lMjk9M^ I '..�..’‘ i,,, 
• fi_yfeK:i&!?.^J?-5.&3a»«.^?t&^?c •'•*'I :if .f:"1 .;^ i^ ^ ^  CutsJ^ i.yik Coxtimfe-nfey ！ r ‘ ； -1 
編 „, • ” ^ _ , 一 ?.v i—-riiifWiiiii'74i^ : <tjtUix^ib-.>w*r-v.r^,Jw^ ,..,•- ： 
• &.9?!5想^??疏九秘.沉1秉:视估.紐.丄份 I 
Akeaid, M^ rkjAkf.b:J!&afe.n uw \__i••_•_讀 - mni�“山⑴,J 
n z : }. ^  2 ^ « :^ ^  ：« 1^  - « 1-. , ii ^  r ；； - i X « i! 二 Si : r ^  2 X '-• - X *• 't 
• Thv FT5DQ: B^st peiforwyr m ？ i�t. % * \ t I 言 $ 11 j S y jt.zt%Z^ t^ n^ t^:^ U^ i^ ―― 
Ii^ E^-"^ .:n?^fei2SL$.?i-.§>i"^ -^?. 
；.^ ���?�>v~~>0 J ������ ;�i _ 
\ PlactngQrdef - j 
T 
^M p^ ^^ j3i^ 3.51icsH>NweSplti^ <e;^ |^i^ f^plu^ ail/Warl .、涵'£7 
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M 二 —  
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.生！ . .. < L±i~1 
Cut l o s s polJlt : 
Take p r o f i t po:Lnt: 
Buy or SeJJ- or Hold : 
B u y ^ S e 0 J _ O 
Contract S i z e : 
100,000(^ /200,000O/300,000O/400,000O /500,000O  
600,000O/70Q,000O/800,000O /9oo,oooO/i,ooo,oQoO T 
y^;^^R^P^^J5^feiSSSS^^K;^:v:‘:i\‘:�_:h:—�;kJ�^gl���：^; ： >®'? 
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( ()I)IN(; S( HFMK -C ()MPLKXITV OF KKASOMX； 
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Study on Investment Decision-Making 
Instructions for Participants 
1 . Dining the investment simulation, please strictly foUow the instructions of 
the administrator. 
2 . The experiment is an individual exercise, please DO NOT discuss with 
others or disturb others.“ 
3 . You can read a news item ONLY ONCE, browsing back and forth a 
news are NOT ALLOWED. 
4 • Note that once you enter the “ Placing Order” page to make BUY / SELL 
decisions, you CANNOT go back to the “ News & Charf, page. 
5 . DO NOT use the pack] function provided by Netscape. It wiU cause data 
error. ffthat happens, you WE.L HAVE TO do the simulation again, 
6 . Upon finishing this questionnaire, please retum this questionnaire to the 
administrator. 
7 • DO NOT disclose any information of this study to others. 
FuU Name: ST. JD.  
USER JD: SEX : 





^ ^ , f / ^ use the foUowing matrix to measure yotir feelings at a particnkr moment Two 
= e s f f=lnigs are of mtere^t: one is your levd of pleasure - that is, how happy or sad you 
feel - and the other is your level of arousal. 而 ^°^ 
_ . ^ ^ > f ^ ^ ^ ' of t matrix represents neutral feeHngs: you are neither happy nor sad and 
— l n r . . ^ T 1 ^ ' ' ~ f ° ^ ' ' ^ ' As you move from the center column t o L ri^S y S ^ 
f o f changes for the better - from feeHng sHghdy happy to moderately happy to very l ^ n / ^ 
fcaHy to extremely happy - and as you move from the center c o W to L left y S ^ 
. . c h a n g e s for the worse -from feeHng sHghtIy sad to moderately sad to very sad to e : c ^ e m d y ^ 
:_ ? a sinul2T m ^ e r , as you move upwards from the center row, your level of arousal become^ 
progressively higher, and as you move downwards from the center row, your level o f ^ u ^ 
becomes progressively lower. � °^ ^ u s a i 
Y T f m ^ t o g ^ e r , for example, if you now feel very happy and excited, you should mark “ 
= X o； B* S f i 。 ， h - ， • - ' . he l . ve" -d ^ ^ mcderatelyaroused you sEoSd S 
^ X ?n B. Sim^arly, if you are expenencmg skghtIy happy and average level of arousal you 
Schould place an X on D. FinaEy, ifyou feel very sad and depressed, you should pJce S x o!； 
• * 
•• • • . 
EXTHgfVlEL,V HIGH AROUSAl. 
— ‘^ ^^ T^^ "^ ^^ "^ ^^ *^ 
J t A . 
.01 -
l j [ _ ” -
> . ] 5 & -
5 UI — > m 
ui tu m g | i ± r : : k n F 4 i ! | 
X ® ni ^ m < m 5 
3 • n ^ i ^ -
I - i 
与 CD -
. ^ i _ _ i i E n z 
EXTREMEt_Y Law AROUSAU. 
<Hease DO NOT tum to the next page undI you are told to do s o � 
• • • • • 
. . • . “ • . . 
• . • • • . 
• •• . 
• . • • . . 
‘ . 
1 
YOUR CURRENT MOOD Ci j 
n^STRUCnON: WIth the following matrix, please mark the one square that best describes 
your mood right now. 
• 一 . — 
* 
.. 




> j s 
5 ui S m 
ui Ui g X 
U\ — _ 一 " - - li ‘ 
- £ ( ： ^^ :=^ =^ ― *n ^ 
X § S | 
Ui < r n 
UI ^ K 
- J - 2 
5 Q 
2 CD 
D I  
‘ . 
M • , . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ™ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^^^^^^m ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
EXTREMELY LOW AROUSAU 
< Now go to the Free Trial page by clicking on the button [Go Free Trial:. 
After finishing it, open PAGE 3 of your questionnaire > 
. ： • . .,. • .. •• , • . . • •• • •. .：• 
.. 
3 
YOUR CURRENT MOOD & 
n^STRUCTION: With the foUowing matrix, please mark the one square that best 
describes your mood right below. 
E X T P E M E L V H I G H A H Q U S A L . . 
— ； ••_ • 
.01 
i - ? 
> 二 s 
5 UI > n 
01 iu CO V 
5 u. > q 
s^ m ~ ^ g 
fc^ ^ _. y.<^^y^j • M Z i 
H- < — — — — r ^ — 21 ？ 
C CD m ^ 
A ^ m m B < 2 r 
5 ^ • n n i ^ ‘ 
\ ~ ~ H i 
• _ J u “ 
E X T R E M E U Y L Q W A R O U S A L . 
Q^. Do you beHeve that you can achieve the foUowing total profit amount? (please circle) 
1. below 0.4 milHon: Yes / No Kyes, indicate your confidence level. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
totally moderately totaUy 
diffident confident confident 
2. 0.4 miUion to 0.8 miUion: Yes / No H"yes, indicate your conJ5dence level. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
totaHy moderately totaUy 
diffident confident confident 
3. 0.8 miUion to 1.2 miUion: Yes / No Kyes, indicate your confidence level. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
••. : totaUy moderately totaUy 
diffident confident confident 
4. 1.2 miUion to 1.6 miUion: Yes / No Lfyes, indicate your confidence level. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
totaUy moderately totally 
diffident confident confident 
5. 1.6 miIHon to 2.0 million: Yes / No Lfyes, indicate your confidence level. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
totally moderately totally 
difSdent confident confident 
E ^ S T R U C T I O N： Now press the button [Go to Trading Page] to start Round One. After 
Round One is finished, complete the questionnaire in the next page. 
十 ‘ 
a 
YOUR CURRENT MOOD ^ Lj> 
1^ ^OU^/ Ort^ Ti/\:A“ 
DESTRUCTION: With the foHowing matrix, please mark the one square that best describes 




EXTRErVIEUV HIGH AROUSAL. 
"^ "**T*"*""T^ "*^ "*T"**"^ T"*^ **" ^ *^ "**^ ^^ *"^ "^*^ *^T*^ *^*j 
01 ‘ ~ 
i - ? 
一 > 二 s 
5 UI > m 
ui ui ^ X 
5 u. . > Q 
• m 卜 i p i 2 二 
g Z I . _ _ _ _ : J m 
_ 卜 < — = — 5 2 
X 2 ^ m 
UI H Ui r 
ui C 1< 
^ - 2 
a ^ ~ ~ • 
2 - m 
D z  
一 EXTREMEUY UaW ARDUSAL. 一 
• • . • . . “ ‘ • 
• ‘ • ” ” .. 
I s 
^^、晷、 “ 
YOUR CURKENT MOOD ^ f 
7or ^ ^ 礼 义 一 < ^ ^n)Ael 
MSTRUCnON: With the foUowing matrix, please mark the one square that best describes 
your mood right now. 
• • _ 
• 
EXTREMEL-Y HIGH AnOUSAU   • • 
.田 : _ 
i — ~ H _ ? 
- > 二 5 
G ui > m 
m ui U3 y 
5 让 z > H 
- 目 _ ： ^ 孝 ： = 工 1 _ 
V 23 m ^ 
^ 二 m rn 
m < E r 
S • - i ^ 
a ^ _ ! I 
1 -_ ° •*^ •^^"*‘ "^ "^""""^"*"^ "^"* ^ "^^ "^ *^ ^ "^ ""^ “^ """"^"""" ^ ^^ "^^ “^ "*"^^^^^^ i^^^mmmm^ 
_ EXTREMEUY LQW ARDUSAL. _ 
. . . . . • .. “ . . . 
. ‘ • . . .. • •• .• 
» 
t T ^ 
4 ^ ^ 
YOUR CURREOT MOOD ^ ^ 
r^ (^n^3 ^n^'s%I 
E^STRUCTION: With the foUowing matrix, please mark the one square that best describes 




EXTREMEUY HIGH AROUaAL. 






- j fn 
5 ui ： ^ ra . 
m UI g X 
S 丄 I ^ H 
^ ,. _ 工 一 l l 
- H < r ~ m 2 
X 5 m m 
ui < r C 
U] 5 •< 
J - 2 
a n 
z - m 
• I  
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1 1 | _ „ . | 圓 _ 仙 丄 丄 」 丄 r - - ---"ffiwa 
i ^ 
如 #ir / 
YOUR CURRENT MOOD ( ^ ^ 
， 7ar i2nj^J^,^nAd 
MSTRUCnON: With the foUowing matrix, please mark the one square that best describes 
your mood right now. 
• — - 一 
i-
• 
EXTREMEUY Hlt3H AROUSAU 
• » 
^^ M* 一 
田 ： _ 
C3 «0 
Z ~ J ~ > ^ 
一 > 二 s 
5 ui > m 
m ui 5 X 
5 IL . > Q 
I ^ “ ^ _ ~ § g 
- ^ | _ L __^——_一；！ 
X § S m 
UJ < r^  r 
UJ [ i< r» - Z a ^ Q 
1 — 1 , 田 
_ EXTREMELV L-QW AROUSAL 一 
• _ 
••. ._ . • • . ••• ••• . 
• • . •• “‘ .• 
/ � h 
Q.8. I dislike this music 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 n/a I like this music 
Q9. I dislike the simulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Ilikethe simulation 
Q10. This simulation is a valuable learning experience. ' 
Strongfy disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
.片 
.»-• 
Q11. Wbiat do you beHeve is the true purpose oftMs study? 
% 
Q12. How can we improve this study? 
-•_^^^^^^^^_>»«>«»>>»>—»*—>»«_^^_«><^^^»*>^^^~~o~«~^»"""»—>^^^^~*«»>*—»"«">">»~^~~^~~~^^~*~*—"^>"»~>~^~»~-»~~~~~^~>>~»««~~-~>~ 
1 
Please check if you have missed any questions before returning this questionnaire to 
the administrator. Thanks. 
6 
^ 1 
• i i wiii. •» >^ Mnic*.tvhaftmi*' ^t^:_ > -^ :s^ iSaM 
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